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ABSTRACT 
The Republic of Bulgaria is situated at the center of a politically and economically 
unstable region. The changes in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989 have provided 
the countries of that part of the continent an opportunity to reintegrate into the community 
of democratic nations. Reform of the armed forces, strengthening of civilian control of 
the military and achieving interoperability with NATO forces are major priorities in the 
process of admission. One of these priorities is the creation of democratic civilian control 
over the military. The existence of a clear legal and constitutional framework, defining 
the relationships between the state and the armed forces has paramount importance for 
exercising the democratic civilian control over the military. 
The existence of developed legal framework is probably even more important in 
the Bulgarian case because of the lack of civil society till 1989 and a law system 
influenced strongly by the Soviet legal theory. The new Bulgarian Constitution was 
adopted in 1991, the Defense and Armed Forces Law in the end of 1995 and amended a 
year later. This thesis represents a study of Bulgarian civil-military relations, legal basis 
for military activities, and how this legal foundation relates to development of the civil-
military relations. 
v 
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The Balkans has been a constant source of instability in Europe. The ethnic 
difference and territorial disputes have earned this region fame as the "powder keg" of 
Europe. Most of these problems remained latent during the communist rule. The end of 
the Cold War opened a Pandora's box and revived these conflicts giving them new 
dimensions and strength. The events in former Yugoslavia 1990-1998 and further 
development of the situation in Kosovo 1997-1998 indicated that the Balkans would 
continue to be a threat to peace and stability in the new century. 
The Republic of Bulgaria is situated at the very center of the constantly unstable 
Balkans. Its geo-strategic position; its moderate and open foreign policy; its traditionally 
well-trained and sufficiently equipped armed forces all made Bulgaria an important factor 
in the improvement of the Balkan situation, in particular, and Europe as a whole. The 
profound changes in South Eastern Europe since 1989 have provided the countries of that 
part of the continent a unique opportunity to reintegrate into the community of free and 
democratic nations. 
For democracy, successful civilian control, defined as supervision of the military 
by civilian officials, is fundamental. Because military's fundamental purpose is to 
prevent or to wage armed conflict, military institutions are designed for controlled 
violence. Over the centuries they have developed the organizational structure, 
procedures, and individual values that are needed to prevail in a war. In the 20th century, 
the Euro-Atlantic democracies have been especially effective in developing such aspects 
of the military. 
xi 
Democratic civilian control is not a single event but a prolonged eternal process, 
as with other aspects of statecraft. This process has just begun for the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe. The beginning of the democratic transformations in the 
post-totalitarian socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Bulgaria, 
followed the standards of the Atlantic-western democracies in the field of civil-military 
relations. Such standards included achieving a high degree of western-style 
professionalism in the military, reaching an effective subordination by the military to the 
civilian leaders and a dear and competent recognition of the role and the social mission 
of the military. 
There are different approaches used to evaluate principles of democratic control 
over military, but all of them include the developed legal basis as important factor for 
such control. This factor is probably even more significant in the Bulgarian case because 
of the lack of civil society till 1989 and a system of law influenced strongly by Soviet 
legal theory. 
The situation has changed since 1990, but the process of adoption of the new laws 
was hindered by a sharp polit~cal contradiction in the Parliament, deterioration of the 
economy, and unstable governments: six within eight years. 
In a period of forty-five years, Bulgarian lawmakers framed three constitutions. 
The ones adopted in 1947 and 1971 were the communist's efforts to legitimate their rule. 
The new Bulgarian Constitution was adopted in 1991. The Armed Forces and Defense 
Act was adopted barely at the end of 1995 and amended a year later. In 1998, new laws 
were drafted concerning military police and alternative military service. The process of 
xii 
creation of the legal basis for democratic civilian control under the military is still in 
progress and research within this area is timely and valuable. 
II. THESIS STATEMENT 
This thesis presents a study of Bulgarian civil-military relations as well as a 
treatment of its historical and political background. The paper describes also the legal 
basis for military activities in Bulgaria and how this legal foundation relates to the 
development of civil-military relations. Special attention will be placed on the role of the 
President in the security environment and his relation with the executive power in this 
area. 
This thesis argues that contemporary civil military relations in Bulgaria are still 
not in accordance with the provided Euro-Atlantic criteria. Although efforts were made 
by Bulgarian authorities, especially during the last year and a half, the legal basis still is 
insufficient for the military and the state. Furthermore, the role of the "dual executives" 
- the President and the Prime Minister in the area of national security - is still not clearly 
defined. Any ambiguity in the area of national security decision-making can threaten the 
establishment of democratic civilian control over the military. Therefore, the existence of 
a developed legal basis regulating national security decision-making process and 
providing a mechanism for firm control over the military is "condition sine qua non" for 
democracies in transition, and Bulgaria in particular. 
xiii 
III. CONCLUSIONS 
Bulgaria must struggle with new regional disorder that has major effects on its 
security. The realities of Balkan wars, Soviet disintegration, and political development 
on the Southern flank of Europe are issues that planners have to master. If countries in 
transition, such as Bulgaria cannot secure sufficiently their position within the new 
Europe, one can expect the old threats of the Balkan nationalism to remerge again. 
Within the Partnership for Peace framework Bulgaria made significant steps 
toward integration into the Euro-Atlantic security arrangements. In this process the 
Bulgarian military underwent a series of changes after 1989. One decisive step among 
those was adoption of the adequate legal basis, particularly in the last amendments of the 
Armed Forces and Defense Act. Thus, the civil-military relations in the country met the 
first requirements for-effective political control over the military. A lot of efforts shoqld 
be directed in the area of restoration of military prestige and effective accountability of 
the Armed Forces. What might be needed above all seems to be: 
1. An intensive military reform expressing itself in an efficient military 
education system. 
2. Increasing the military professionalism of the Officer Corps. 
3. Increasing military efficiency by switching from conscript to professional 
army. 
4. Reducing the total number of the Armed forces but improving their mobility 
and training. 
5. Increasing the social status of the military personnel. 
6. Eliminating the ambiguities in the legal framework. 
Recent changes in the legal basis gave a firm foundation for these steps. It is up 
to the Bulgarian political and military leaders to make this project work. 
xiv 
Bulgaria stated clearly its desire to become a member of the Atlantic Alliance. It 
also declared its readiness to start accession negotiations. A key aspect of Bulgarian 
strategy for NATO's admission is to demonstrate commitment to being a responsible 
partner and reliable future ally able to meet the obligations of membership. This 
objectiv~ can not be achieved without effective and durable democratic civilian control 
over the military. 
The prerequisite for such control is a clearly defined and fully accepted civilian 
decision-making system. Although the Armed Forces and Defense Act introduced the 
basic principles and norms in order to facilitate civilian control over the military, the 
process of legal reform is not completed. The National Security Concept, adopted 
recently, defined the nation's objective are in the process of building a safe national 
security environment. The Euro-Atlantic integration is a part of the concept and its 
paramount goal. This goal introduces a variety of indispensable requirements and 
standards that Bulgaria has to meet in order to accomplish it. The existence of a 
developed and thorough legal basis for every single act of military activity will diminish 
the chances of ambiguities or unclearness in this area. It will support establishing firm 
democratic civilian control over the military and ensure that non-appropriate involvement 
in politics will occur. 
Political and economical instability in the country elevated the role of the 
President's office, although the Constitution promulgated Bulgaria as a parliamentarian 
republic. Directly elected, the President had to abandon his arbiter's position and to play 
a significant role in politics. Apparently, he enjoys a lot of public confidence and is seen 
as a pillar of the democratic process. The President, as a supreme commander, has 
xv 
significant authority over the military, thus becoming a major actor in national security 
decision-making. Therefore, the precise distinction should be made between his and the 
Prime Minister's authority in order to escape any ambiguities and overlapping of 
responsibilities. Otherwise, the military would not know how to maneuver between both 
and whose order to follow. 
Only when there are no such ambiguities or obscurities it is possible to divide the 
functions related to the national security between several institutions without jeopardizing 
the main goal - creating a stable and safe national security environment. 
XVI 
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The Balkans has been a constant source of instability in Europe. The ethnic 
difference and territorial disputes have earned this region fame as the "powder keg" of . 
Europe. Most of these problems remained latent during the communist rule. The end of 
the Cold War opened a Pandora's box and revived these conflicts giving them new 
dimensions and strength. The events in former Yugoslavia 1990-1998 and further 
development of the situation in Kosovo 1997-1998, indicated that the Balkans would 
continue to be a threat to peace and stability in the new century. 
This thesis presents a study of Bulgarian civil-military relations as well as a 
treatment of its historical and political background. The paper describes also the legal 
basis for military activities in Bulgaria and how this legal foundation relates to the 
development of civil-military relations. Special attention will be placed on the role of the 
President in the security environment and his relation with the executive power in this 
area. 
This thesis argues that contemporary civil-military relations in Bulgaria are still 
not in accordance with the provided Euro-Atlantic criteria. Although efforts were made 
by Bulgarian authorities, especially during the last year and a half, the legal basis still is 
insufficient for the military and the state. Furthermore, the role of the "dual executives" 
- the President and the Prime Minister in the area of national security - is still not clearly 
defined. Any ambiguity in the area of national security decision-making can threaten the 
establishment of democratic civilian control over the military. Therefore, the existence of 
a developed legal basis regulating national security decision-making process and 
1 
providing a mechanism for firm control over the military is "condition sine qua non" for 
democracies in transition, and Bulgaria in particular. 
The Republic of Bulgaria is situated at the very center of the constantly unstable 
Balkans. Its geo-strategic position; its moderate and open foreign policy; its traditionally 
well-trained and sufficiently equipped armed forces all made Bulgaria an important factor 
in the improvement of the Balkan situation, in particular, and Europe as a whole. The 
profound changes in South Eastern Europe since 1989 have provided the countries of that 
part of the continent a unique opportunity to reintegrate into the community of free and 
democratic nations. As the Bulgarian foreign minister Nadezhda Mihailova pointed out: 
In Bulgaria, we see membership in the Atlantic Alliance, the 
European Union and the Western European Union not only as a reliable 
source of security guarantees but also as a natural expression of our 
foreign policy orientation. The very prospect of membership has provided 
an incentive for reform in our country, acting as a stimulus for 
modernization and as one of the main influences on Bulgaria's 
constructive and peaceful foreign policy over the last seven years. 1 
As the cases of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary demonstrate, reform of 
the armed forces, strengthening of civilian control of the military and achieving 
interoperability with NATO forces are major priorities in, the process of admission. The 
very process of acceding is comprehensive and depends on successful accomplishment of 
certain requirements, equal for all applying states. One of these chief criteria is the 
creation of democratic civilian control over the military forces.2 
1 Nadezhda Mihailova, "Security in south-eastern Europe and Bulgaria's policy of NATO integration," 
NATO Review, spring 1998, pp. 6-9. 
2 Study of NATO Enlargement, September 1995, "NATO Official documents." Available [Online]: 
http://www.nato.int. 5 September, 1998. • 
2 
For democracy, successful civilian control, defined as supervision of the military 
by civilian officials, is fundamental. Because military's fundamental purpose is to 
prevent or to wage armed conflict, military institutions are designed for controlled 
violence. Over the centuries they have developed the organizational structure, 
procedures, and individual values that are needed to prevail in a war. In the 20th century, 
the Euro-Atlantic democracies have been especially effective in developing such aspects 
of the military. 
Democratic control should always be a two-way process between armed forces 
and society. As put in the words of German Major General Harald Kujat, the former 
Assistant Director of the Plans and Policy Division, of the International Military Staff of 
NATO, Brussels: 
In a democracy, firm constitutional guarantees should protect the 
state - including the armed forces - from two types of potential dangers: 
from politicians, who have military ambitions, and from military with 
political ambitions.3 
Forty years ago, the well-known theorist of civilian control, Samuel P. 
Huntington, argued, that the way to optimize civilian supremacy was to recognize such 
"autonomous military professionalism.,,4 In what he called "objective civilian control,"5 
Huntington asserted that the state should encourage an independent military sphere so 
3 Major General Harald Kujat, "The Role of the Military in a Democracy," July 1998, "NATO Official 
documents." Available [Online]: http://www.nato.int/spcechI1998/s980702h.htm. 14 October 1998. 
4 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, 1985, p. 83. 
5 Ibid. 
3 
different civilian groups would not maximize their power in military affairs by involving 
the military in political activity. 
Such interference, he believed, not only harmed the effectiveness of military 
forces and thus a nation's security, but also actually invited the military to involve itself 
in govemance, beyond national security affairs. An officer corps focused on its own 
profession, and granted sufficient independence to organize itself and practice the art of 
war without interference in those areas which required technical expertise, would be 
politically neutral and less likely to intervene in politics. 
Since 1914, with war increasingly dangerous and destructive, civilians have 
wished to gain wider control over combat to assure balance with political and strategic 
purposes. With weapons and operations becoming ever more technical and complex, 
. military leaders will want as much clarity in instruction and autonomy in execution in 
order to assure success with the least human and resource cost. 6 
Democratic civilian control is not a single event but a prolonged eternal process, 
as with other aspects of statecraft. This process has just begun for the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe. The beginning of the democqltic transformations in the 
post-totalitarian socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Bulgaria, 
followed the standards of the Atlantic-western democracies in the field of civil-military 
relations. Such standards included achieving a high degree of western-style 
professionalism in the military, reaching an effective subordination by the military to the 
6 See Richard Kohn, "An Essay on Civilian Control of the Military" Available [Online]: 
http://www.unc.eduldepts/diplomatlamdipl 3fkohn.html, 24 August 1998. 
4 
civilian leaders and a dear and competent recognition of the role and the social mission 
of the military. 
There are different approaches used to evaluate principles of democratic control 
over military. As Jeffrey Simon, Senior Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic 
Studies, Washington, D.C., one of the prominent scholars in the area of civil-military 
relations asserts, there are four conditions for the existence of effective democratic 
oversight and management of the military: 
1. A clear division of authority between president and the 
government (Prime 'minister and defense/interior minister) in 
Constitutions or trough public law. 
2. Parliamentary oversight of the military through control of the 
defense budget. 
3. Peacetime government oversight of General Staff and military 
commanders through civilian defense ministries. 
4. Restoration of military prestige, trustworthiness and accountability 
for the armed forces to be effective.7 
Major General Kujat, in his speech to NATO information seminar in Saraevo, 
Bosnia on 2nd and 3rd July this year added two more principles to these pointed out by 
Simon. 
According to him they are: 
1. The existence of a clear legal and constitutional framework, 
defining the basic relationship between the state and the armed 
forces. 
7 Jeffry Simon, NATO Enlargement and Central Europe, A study in Civil-Military Relations, Washington, 
Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1996, pp. 26-27. 
5 
2. A significant role of parliament in legislating defense and security 
matters, in influencing the formulation of national strategy, in 
contributing transparency to decisions concerning deftness and 
security policy, in giving budget approval and in controlling 
spending - using 'the power of the purse' in issues related to 'the 
power of the sword.' 
3. The hierarchical responsibility of the military to the government 
through a civilian organ of public administration - a ministry or 
department of defense - that is charged, as a general rule, with the 
direction and supervision of its activity. 
4. The presence of a well trained and experienced military corps that 
is respected and funded by a civilian authority. It acknowledges the 
principle of civilian control, including the principle of political 
neutrality and non-partisanship of the armed forces. 
5. The existence of a developed civil society, with a clear 
understanding of democratic institutions and values, and, as a part 
of the political culture, a nation-wide consensus on the role and 
mission of their military. 
6. The presence of a reasonable non-governmental component within 
the defense community capable of participating in public debate on 
defense and security policy, presenting alternative views and 
programs. 8 
As we can see, both authors include the legal framework as an important 
prerequisite for democratic civilian control. This factor is probably even more significant 
in the Bulgarian case because ·of the lack of civil society till 1989 and a system of law 
influenced strongly by Soviet legal theory. 
The situation has changed since 1990, but the process of adoption of the new laws 
was hindered by a sharp political contradiction in the Parliament, deterioration of the 
economy, and unstable governm~nts: six within eight years. 
8 Major General Harald Kujat, "The Role of the Military in a Democracy," July 1998, "NATO Official 
documents." Available [Online]: http://www.nato.intlspeechII998/s980702h.htm. 14 October 1998. 
6 
In a period of forty-five years, Bulgarian lawmakers framed three constitutions. 
The ones adopted in 1947 and 1971 were the communist's efforts to legitimate their rule. 
The new Bulgarian Constitution was adopted in 1991. The Armed Forces and Defense 
Act was adopted barely at the end of 1995 and amended a year later. In 1998, new laws 
were drafted concerning military police and alternative military service. The process of 
creation of the legal basis for democratic civilian control under the military is still in 
progress and research within this area is timely and valuable. 
7 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. FROM LIBERATION TO NATIONAL CONSOLIDATION 1878-1944 
Although Bulgarians are proud of more than thirteen centuries of history, the 
modern Bulgarian State was created as a result of the Russo-Turkish war of 1876-78. 
The Russian victory dictated to the Ottoman Empire the Treaty of San Stefano and 
produced a "vast Bulgarian state, encompassing most of Macedonia and having access to 
the Aegean.,,9 Thus, ended almost five centuries of Turkish domination. In the 
Medieval times Bulgaria was a powerful kingdom. The new Bulgarian state lO emerged 
as an insignificant agrarian country strongly dominated by the policy of the European 
Great Powers. Soon after the liberation, Britain and Austria-Hungary, who feared that a 
large Bulgarian state would contribute to Russian power in the Balkans, used their 
influence to reduce Bulgaria's size by two-thirds in the 1878 Treaty of Berlin. I I 
The treaty confined Bulgaria to the area between the Danube and the Balkan 
Mountains: the area south of these mountains was declared autonomous Ottoman 
province - East Rumelia. Alexander Battemberg, a German prince, was imported as a 
Bulgarian monarch. 12 This contributed to the orientation of Bulgaria as a German ally in 
both world wars, partly because of aspirations to regain territories lost by the unjust 
9 Andrew Michta, The Government and Politics of Postcommunist Europe, Westport, Connecticut London, 
Praeger, 1994,pp.88. 
10 It was called The Third Bulgarian Kingdom. 
11 Michta, p. 88. 
12 He had fought with the Russian army in 1877-1878 but was also acceptable to the other great powers. 
9 
Treaty of Berlin. The first Bulgarian Constitution was adopted in 1879 and was amongst 
the most democratic in Europe. 13 The Constitution promulgated Bulgaria as 
constitutional monarchy with a unicameral parliament and included guarantees of 
absolute political and civil liberties. 
In 1885, following the union between Bulgaria and East Rumelia, Serbian armed 
forces invaded Bulgarian territory, but were quickly stopped and subsequently defeated 
by the newly born Bulgarian armed forces where the highest military rank was captain.14 
The decisive battle of Slivnitsa15 secured the union and the new state and opened the 
opportunity for Bulgarian entry into Belgrade that was "prevented only by Austrian 
diplomatic intervention.,,16 This war greatly enhanced the reputation of Bulgaria, but its 
diplomatic result - the treaty of Bucharest - did not recognize the union. 
This time, Russia was able to express its discontent with the presence of 
Alexander Battenberg as prince in Sofia. The Prince's personnel policy in the army after 
the war also contributed to his abdication. A point of discontent between him and the 
senior officers was the army model. Battemberg had tried to shape his new army "after 
the German rather than the Russian model," 17 but as the officer corps was largely trained 
in Russian they opposed this attempt. 
13 Richard Crampton, A Short History of Modem Bulgaria, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, 
p.24. 
14 Ipid., p. 29. 
15 Slivnitsa is a small town situated at 25 miles west from Sofia, near the border with Yugoslavia. 
16 Crampton, p. 30. 
17 Ibid. p. 31. 
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On 20 August 1886, an well-organized military coup d'etat was initiated. Despite 
the general atmosphere of discontent, the removal of the prince was far from popular, and 
the Prime Minister Stefan Stambolov was able to organize an effective opposition. 
Within days Sofia was surrounded by the troops loyal to the prince, but he realized that 
without Russian support his stay in Sofia was at risk. Only .several days later he 
appointed a three-man regency and left the country. 
A year later Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha was approved by the Grand 
National Assembly as the Bulgarian monarch. In 1908, while Turkey was preoccupied 
with the Young Turks movement, Ferdinand declared complete independence from the 
Ottoman Empire. The vassal status, which the treaty of Berlin had enforced upon the 
country, was ended on 5 October and Ferdinand assumed the title of king.1 8 Full 
independence made Bulgaria a more active party in the Balkan politics. The end of 
Ottoman occupation heightened territorial ambitions that involved Bulgaria and its 
neighbors in three wars within four years. 19 
The period from 1908 to 1912 was one of conflicting interests in the Balkans and 
collapse of the system created by the Treaty of Berlin. In,1912, after negotiations, Serbia 
and Bulgaria reached a temporary agreement on the disposition of Macedonia, the chief 
issue separating them. Subsequent agreements by Greece with Serbia, Bulgaria, and 
Montenegro completed the Balkan League, an alliance designed by Russia to finally push 
the Turks out of Europe and diminish great-power interest in the Balkans. 
18 In Bulgarian tradition the monarch is called "Tsar". 
19 "Bulgaria a country study," Federal Research Division Library of Congress, Glenn Curtis, ed., 
Washington, 1992, p. 29. ' 
11 
The First Balkan War began in October 1912. Bulgarian forces moved quickly 
across the Ottoman Europe, driving the Turks out of Thrace. The Bulgarian 
achievements in this war were summarized by a British war correspondent: 
A nation with a population of less than five million and a military 
budget of less than two million pounds per annum placed in the field 
within fourteen days of mobilization an army of 400,000 men, and in the 
course of four weeks moved that army over 160 miles in hostile territory, 
captured one fortress and invested another, fought and won two great 
battles against the available armed strength of a nation of twenty million 
inhabitants, and stopped only at the gates of the hostile capital.20 
After several unsuccessful attempts to conquer Constantinople, Ferdinand realized 
that peace is the only option. In the peace negotiations that followed, Bulgaria regained 
Thrace, but the alliance against the Turks collapsed over the unresolved issue of 
Macedonia. 
The final removal of the Turks from Europe posed the problem of dividing the 
Ottoman territory and heightened the worries of the European great powers about the 
balance of influence in that strategic region.21 Disagreement about the disposition of 
Macedonia and demanded compensation on the basis of "direct proportion to the 
magnitude of their military effort and sacrific~,,22 quickly rearranged the alliances of the 
First Balkan War. 
20 David Johnson, "Splendid fellows, splendidly led - In 1878, Bulgaria had no army. By 1913, it had one 
of the most formidable land forces in Europe." Available [Online]: 
http://www.thchistirvncLcomIMilitaryHistory/artidcsI1997/0897tcxt.htm. September 20, 1998. 
21 Curtis, p. 30. 
22 Crampton, p. 61. 
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These controversies ignited a Second Balkan War in 1913, when Bulgaria 
attacked Serbia. Turkey, Greece, and Romania then declared war on Bulgaria because 
they all feared Bulgarian domination of the Balkans if Macedonia were not partitioned. 
Because most Bulgarian forces were on the Serbia border, Turkish and Romanian troops 
easily occupied Bulgarian territory by mid-1913, and Bulgaria was defeated. The Treaty 
of Bucharest (1913) allowed Bulgaria to retain only very small parts of Macedonia and 
Thrace; Greece and Serbia divided the rest, insulting Bulgarian territorial claims and 
annulling the gains of the First Balkan War. 
In 1915, largely in the hope of gaining lost territory Tsar Ferdinand favored 
Central Powers in World War I. For its participation on the side of Central Powers, 
Bulgaria expected part of Turkish Thrace, substantial territory in Macedonia, and 
monetary compensation for war expenses. 
In October 1915, a secret treaty was signed with the Central Powers and 
Bulgarian forces invaded Serbia and Macedonia. After initial success Bulgaria suffered 
from the devastation of the war, economic collapse and defeat and disintegration of its 
army. 23 
By 1917 the military stalemate and poor living conditions combined with news of 
revolution in Russia contributed to large-scale unrest in the Bulgarian society. By 
September 1918 the Bulgarian army was thoroughly demoralized by antiwar propaganda 
and harsh conditions. A battle with the British and French at Dobro Pole brought total 
23 See Michta, p. 88. 
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retreat, and in ten days Entente forces entered Bulgaria.24 Several days later an armistice 
was signed and Bulgaria left the war defeated. 
As a result of this loss and an extremely severe economic situation, Ferdinand was 
forced to resign and his son Boris III became tsar. The Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine of 27 
November 1919 imposed a humiliating and unjust peace treaty upon Bulgaria, depriving 
it of a lot of its territory. The treaty limited the post-war Bulgarian Army to a small 
volunteer force of 20,000 men. These limitations caused enormous distress in the Officer 
Corps. As a result of the war Bulgaria emerged as a revisionist state with a deep sense of 
humiliation and natio~al resentment toward the Entente powers.25 
The period after World War I was characterized by slow economic growth, 
uneasy political coalitions and strong involvement of the military in political life. The 
military factions were some of the decisive allies among the opposition groups that 
toppled the agrarian government headed by the peasant's leader Alexander Stamboljiski, 
in June 1923. The world crisis that begun in 1929 ruined the Bulgarian economy. 
In the 30's a new coalition with the name Zveno emerged on the political 
scene.26 The leaders of Zveno were two Army colonels '- Damian Ve1chev and Kimon 
Georgiev. Zveno's main goal was "to consolidate and reform existing political 
institutions so that state power could be exerted directly to promote economic growth.,,27 
24 See Crampton, p. 71 
25 See Michta, p. 89. 
26 In Bulgarian it means link of a chain. 
27 Curtis, p. 38. 
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Zveno drew its membership from intellectual, commercial, and military circles. It 
advocated "national restoration" through an authoritarian, technocratic regime. The 
military played an important role in this coalition. A Military League, a professional 
military organization that was created after the defeat in World War I, with the main 
purpose to protect the interests of the officers and NCOs from the burdens imposed by 
the peace treaty, tried to playa leading role in politics. 
On the night of May 18th _19th , 1934, the Military League carried out a coup d'etat 
described as an "excellently planned and executed operation,,28 that installed Kimon 
Georgiev as Prime minister. The Zveno government, advised by Velchev, assumed a 
dictatorial character, dissolved Parliament, and abolished all political parties. It imposed 
strict censorship on newspapers, prohibited trade unions, and reorganized the educational 
system to stimulate the training of more technicians and scientists and to discourage the 
formation of a large intelligentsia. 
Shortly after taking office, Georgiev suppressed the Internal Macedoriian 
Revolutionary Organization that was gUilty for serial terrorist attacks, established 
friendlier relations with Yugoslavia, and resumed diplomatic, relations with the Soviet 
Union. In addition, his government reduced the peasants' debts, reformed the nation's 
credit system, and encouraged the extension of professional medical care into rural 
areas.29 
28 Crapmton, p. Ill. 
29 See Curtis, p. 38. 
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The "divisive forces" associated with parliamentary politics were eliminated by 
the suspension of the constitution and the suppression of all political parties.30 A new 
assembly was created, composed of individuals without party affiliation and elected from 
approved government lists. 
The real beneficiary of the 1934 coup, though, was Tsar Boris III. He relied on 
his own clique in the army to unseat and jail Georgiev, and to install a subservient 
government, by the end of 1935. Bulgaria thus ended the 1930s as a royal-military 
dictatorship, the form of government that had become nearly universal in Eastern 
Europe.31 
When World War II began in Europe, Bulgaria proclaimed neutrality.32 The 
increasing power of Germany in the Bulgarian political life was manifested in 1940 by 
the removal of the pro-Western Prime minister33 and his replacement by notorious 
Germanophile, Bogdan Filov. Needing Bulgaria to anchor its Balkan flank, Germany 
increased diplomatic and military pressure. 34 
The desire for territorial expansion at the expense of Yugoslavia and Greece and 
the awareness that German troops would have to pass through Bulgaria to reach Greece 
30 See Crampton, p. 112. 
31 See "Balkan States: History: Postwar politics and government." Britannica Online: Available [Online]: 
http://www.eb.com: l80/cgi-bin/g?DocF=macro/5000/55/67 .hunl, 1 August 1998. 
32 See Crampton, p. 121. 
33 Georgi Kioseivanov was appointed by the king to serve as Prime Minister after the defeat of Zveno 
1936 -1940. 
34 Curtis, p. 41. 
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led Boris to join the Axis on March 1, 1941. German troops used Bulgaria as a base from 
which to attack Yugoslavia and Greece, and in return Bulgarian forces were permitted to 
occupy Greek Thrace, Yugoslav Macedonia, and part of Serbia. After the German 
invasion of the Soviet Union and the Japanese attack on the U.S. naval installation at 
Pearl Harbor in 1941, Bulgaria yielded to German pressure to declare war on Great 
Britain and the United States. That move was regarded as having symbolic importance 
only, and Tsar Boris avoided joining the war against the Soviet Union, fearing that it 
would lead to public unrest. 
After the German attack on the Soviet Union, the Bulgarian Communist Party 
organized the resistance against Nazis inside the country. About 10,000 persons are 
estimated to have participated in the resistance movement, making it the largest 
resistance movement among all of Germany's allies. Politically, the communists sought 
the coalition with other opposition groups, and in August 1943 the Fatherland Front was 
formed, composed of communists, left-Agrarians, Zveno, socialists, and some 
independent political figures. The front's influence grew as the military situation of 
Germany deteriorated. 
In May 1944, faced with the continuing German collapse and harsh Allied threats 
that Germany's allies would be severely punished, the Bulgarian government began secret 
negotiations for surrender with the Allies. 3~ An attempt to proclaim Bulgarian neutrality 
in August 1944 was rejected as insufficient by both Britain and the Soviet Union. 
On September 5, 1944, the Soviet Union declared war on Bulgaria, and Soviet 
forces began to enter the country unopposed. Thus, the country managed to be at war 
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simultaneously with all warring groups.36 Concurrently, the Fatherland Front began 
preparations for a coup d'etat. On September 8, military forces organized by Zveno and 
partisan detachments of communist resistance occupied key points in Sofia and toppled 
the government in the name of the Fatherland Front. Kimon Georgiev of Zveno became 
the new Prime Minister, thus headed the government of the Fatherland Front. 
B. THE COMMUNIST RULE 1944-1989 
The earliest Marxists in Bulgaria were faced with an underdeveloped society with 
a largely peasant population and without striking inequalities in income. Under normal 
circumstances the communist party had to face a long wait until gaining influence and 
power. The Balkan Wars and humiliation after the defeat in World War I caused a rapid 
. sequence of disproportionate human and material losses. Those facts contributed to the 
communists' popUlarity because they opposed the war. Furthermore, Bulgarian 
communists had very close relations with their Russian colleagues. A Bulgarian was the 
first organizer of the Marx group in Russia in 1883.37 George Dimitrov, who had gotten 
a world popUlarity after the Leipzig Trial in which he defended himself against false Nazi 
claims, in the 1930's became a chairman of the Moscow based Comintern. Many other 
Bulgarian communists had served in different Soviet State or party institutions, the 
majority of them in the Red Army. 
35 See Crampton, p. 133. 
36 L.A.D.Delin, The Communist Parties of Eastern Europe, New York, Columbia University Press, Ed. 
Stephen Fischer-Galati, 1979, p. 55. 
37 Ibid., p. 49. 
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In the 20's the Bulgarian communist party became influential as a political force, 
though mostly because of outside events. In September 1923 the party organized and 
carried out an unsuccessful attempt to seize power that brought about its official 
prohibition.38 Its second chance at success came as a consequence of the world "Great" 
depression in the 1930's, when under another name it won 31 out of 274 seats in the 
parliamentarian elections of 1931. 39 However, the dissolution of all political parties by 
the Zveno government forced the party to go underground. 
The party emerged as an important political factor framing the new political map 
of Bulgaria in September 1944. The Bulgarian communist party (BCP) gradually 
consolidated its position, elimjnating its Fatherland Front allies. Major steps were made 
in order to neutralize the army that had a tradition of decisive participation in politics. 
Soldiers councils were formed in marty regiments and 8000fficers removed. The attack 
upon the army involved not only the removal of unreliable officers but also an 
introduction of political commissars.40 The whole Bulgarian army, as a potential rival, 
was sent out of the country to fight with the German forces under Soviet command. 
After the end of the military operations the leadership of the army was purged and the 
influence of the conspiratorial Military League eradicated. The monarchy was abolished 
by a referendum in 1946 and the BCP's political monopoly was consolidated. In 1947 the 
new Constitution that legitimized party rule was adopted. 
38 Ibid. p. 50. 
39 Ibid., p. 51. 
40 Crapmton, p. 146. 
19 
In 1954 Todor Zhivkov was elected leader of the communist party. Surviving 
Khrushchev's overthrow in 1964, Zhivkov exercised power for another 27 years, making 
him the dean of the Warsaw Pact leaders. The story of his success was hidden in his. 
ability to demonstrate ultra-loyalty to the Soviet Union. This approach was partly a 
product of the traditional pro-Russian sentiments in a society where Russia was perceived 
as a liberator, but it was also the natural response of a rigid and unimaginative party 
leadership.41 Under Zhivkov's rule Bulgaria became one of the milder communist 
regimes in the region.42 
An experimental, although basically conservative, attitude to economic reforms 
produced a reasonably successful agricultural basis and the appearance of dynamism in 
industry.43 In the 1980s, however, foreign debt rose sharply, due to an increase in oil 
prices, reductions in Soviet subsidies and delays in structural reform, which made 
attempts to finance investment and consumption futile.44 
C. THE HARD TIME OF CHANGE (1989-1997) 
On November 10, 1989 the day after the Berlin Wall came down, Politburo 
colleagues forced Zhivkov's resignation "on health grounds." There were massive street 
41 Marek Bankowicz, "Bulgaria: The Continuing Revolution" in The New Democracies in Eastern 
Europe-Party systems and Political Cleavages, ed. Sten Berglund, and Jan Ake Dellenbrant, 2 edition, 
Vermont, Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 1994, p. 229. 
42 See J.F.Brown, The Challenge to Soviet Interests in Eastern Europe: Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, The 
Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, December 1986, p. 16. 
43 Ibid. pp. to-II. 
44 See EIU" Country Profiles - Bulgaria," December 19, 1997. Available [LexisINexis]: 
EUROPEIBULGAR, 15 August 1998. 
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demonstrations, and the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), an umbrella organization of 
anti-regime groupings, was fonned in December 1989. The BCP made many 
compromises, trying to adapt to the new situation. Clauses in the constitution 
promulgating the BCP's political monopoly were revoked. The BCP itself was renamed 
the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). A new government under the fonner minister of 
foreign trade at the time of Zhivkov, Andrei Lukanov was installed and the opposition 
was engaged in "round-table" discussions.45 This way of transition to democracy was 
described by Linz and Stepan as one that was " initiated and never lost contro1"46 from 
the leaders of the previous regime. 
As other post-communist states in the Balkans, Bulgaria suffered from a so-called 
"democratic deficit,,47 that hampered the transition to democracy. None of the post-
communist states in this area had a strong legacy of democratic rule. Most of them had 
experience with autocratic or military rule during the inter-war period. The communist 
rule in these states was more repressive than in Central Europe and this fact disallowed 
the existence of a developed civil society.48 The communist regime in Bulgaria was finn 
and acted decisively in discouraging any attempt at civil society building. Hence, when 
communism collapsed, there were o·nly a few organized groups to direct political 
45 See Bankowiz, p. 232. 
46 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, Baltimore and 
London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, p. 333. 
47 See F.Stephen Larrabee, Instability and Change in the Balkans, Santa Monica, RAND Publications, 
1992, p. 32. 
48 Ibid. 
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participation. That is why the process of democratization in Bulgaria and other Balkan 
post-communist states has been more chaotic and violent than the one in Central Europe. 
The first eight post-communist years were years of political instability and 
economic distress in Bulgaria. The first free elections of the Grand National Assembly in 
45 years were held in June 1990. The main purpose of the elections was creation of a 
legislative body that would adopt a new Constitution. Both, the communists and the 
opposition realized the importance of electoral victory. 
Free and competitive elections, are the cornerstone on which democracy is built. 
Elections can provide a representative government, a mechanism of control, give 
opportunity for citizens to participate in the political life of the society, and last but not 
least the elections can provide a legitimate political system.49 So, BSP needed electoral 
victory since it wou·id allow the party. time to transform its political power into ·an 
economic one, using the process of privatization. 
On the election BSP won 48 percent of the vote and 52 percent of the 400 seats. 50 
Thus, a newly created "socialist" party was able to produce a Parliament that would adopt 
laws in favor of its aims. This result came as a surprise. In most of the former 
communist countries the first elections clearly showed a negative attitude of the voters 
against former leaders. In Bulgaria's case the result demonstrated how strong the 
influence and the real power of the socialist party had been. 
49 Ibid, p. 100. 
50 Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich K. Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies: 
Rebuilding the Ship at Sea, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 148. 
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In July 1990 Petar Mladenov, leader of the 1989 coup, was expelled from his 
office as state president and replaced by the UDF leader, Zhelyu Zhelev.51 After 
attempts to involve the opposition into a broad government of national unity, Lukanov 
formed a cabinet in September 1990, but proved unable to rule. The situation in Bulgaria 
became comparable to the personal arrangements in Poland. In Bulgaria the opposition 
gained the presidency, while the communists retained control of the government. In 
Poland it had been the other way around. 
As the economic situation deteriorated, the unions staged a national strike and 
Lukanov resigned. In late December 1990 a "government of experts" emerged, headed 
by the non-partisan judge Dimitar ·Popov. It contained BSP, UDF, and Bulgarian 
Agrarian National Union members. The government had a limited mandate, focusing on 
Emergency economic measures, the new constitution and new elections. The new 
constitution was passed in July 1991. This accomplished the mission of the Grand 
National Assembly. 
The new elections were held in October 1991 and produced a parliament with a 
slight UDF majority. The UDF won 34.36 percent of the vote and got 110 seats (45.9 
percent), the BSP got 33.14 percent of the vote and 106 seats (44.2 percent), and the 
MRF 7.55 percent of the vote and 24 seats (10 percent).52 The UDF formed a 
government headed by Fillip Dimitrov with the support of the Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms (MRF) , which held the balance of power in parliament. Despite passing a 
51 See Bankowiz, p. 233. Zhelyu Zhelev had been a President since July 1990 to January 1997. First, he 
was elected by the Parliament in July 1990, the second term he got as a result of direct elections in January 
1992. 
52 See Elster, Offe, and Preuss, p. 121. 
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privatization law and a revamped foreign investment law, the UDF experienced growing 
differences both with the MRF and within its own ranks. Zhelev also became hostile to 
the UDF's extreme style of anti-communism. A scandal involving arms exports to former 
Yugoslavia caused a vote of confidence, which Dimitrov lost. 
A compromise emerged at the end of 1992 with another "government of experts," 
headed by the-professor of economics Lyuben Berov. This government was supported by 
the MRF, the BSP, and one faction of the UDF. However, by early 1994 the government 
was under fire from President Zhelev, the MRF, and the trade unions, its unpopularity 
fueled by the drastic depreciation of the Lev (national currency) in March. Having 
achieved a long-awaited settlement with the country's commercial debtors in June 1994, 
Berov stood down.53 Elections followed in December 1994 and yielded a majority of 
125 seats54 for the BSP and its left-wing allies. 
The BSP, which under Zhan Videnov had stressed its ability to deliver humane 
and controlled reform, formed a new government. But Videnov's government was not a 
success. Suspicions of corruption among Videnov's entourage grew as grain was 
exported in the middle of a grain shortage in winter 1995. The economy began to 
deteriorate in 1996. In November the International Monetary Fund insisted on a currency 
board, which began to operate in July 1997. In November 3, 1996 the UDF's candidate 
for president, Petur Stoyanov won a convincing victory with 15 percent more votes than 
53 See EIU " Country Profiles - Bulgaria ", December 19, 1997. Available (LexislNexis): 
EUROPEIBULGAR, 15 August 1998. 
54 See Elster, Offe, and Preuss, p. 148. 
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BSP's candidate. That was a clear indication of the people's attitude toward the socialist 
capacity to rule. 
In late December 1996, after the crash of the national currency, Videnov resigned 
as both state and party leader. His interior minister, Nikolay Dobrev, was designated by 
the BSP as the next premier, but public opinion stopped the appointment. There was a 
demonstration in front of parliament on January 10, 1997. People broke into the building 
and police used force against the crowd. In transitional arrangements the UDF-aligned 
mayor of Sofia, Stefan Sofianski, became caretaker Prime minister, heading a largely 
like-minded cabinet. . 
The popularity of Sofianski's government and of the similarly UDF-aligned 
president, Petar Stoyanov (he had helped defuse the situation in early February) increased 
the popularity of the UDF. With its allies in the United Democratic Forces (UtdDF), it 
won a comfortable majority of 138 seats55 in parliamentary elections in April 1997 .. The 
BSP emerged as the second largest force with 58 seats. 
The UDF leader, Ivan Kostov, formed a UtdDF government in May 1997. The 
currency board was set up on July 1. By the end of 1997 the economy was recovering. 
An important legislation on banking and crime control had been passed which pleased the 
IMF and the World Bank, and unity within the UtdDF had been preserved. 56 
The new government declared Bulgaria's desire for full membership in NATO in 
February 1997. 
55 "Union of Democratic Forces" Available [Online]: http://www.bild.acad.bg/udf. 5 September 1998. 
56 See EIU" Country Profiles - Bulgaria," December 19, 1997. Available [LexislNexis]: 
EUROPEIBULGAR, 15 August 1998. • 
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III. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY 
A. FROM BATTLES TO COUPS 
As Figure 1 depicts, the military plays a very important role in the Bulgarian 
society. The armed forces enjoy a constant, comparatively high level of respect from the 
civilian population. 57 
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Figure 1. Confidence in State Institutions - 199758 
The military contributed to the consolidation of the independent Bulgarian state 
and the military prestige was an important factor in the foreign policy of the country in 
the first decades of the 20th century. 
57 See also Table 1 in the Appendix A. 
58 The Source is BBSS Gallup International, Archive, July 1998, Available: [Online] 
www.home.aster.net/crallup/home.html. 23 November 1998. 
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Bulgarian soldiers participated in five major conflicts, including both world wars, 
in a period of sixty years.59 Constant instability in the area required a large standing 
army. The existing alliances had short lives;60 therefore the state had to concentrate 
major human and financial resources in order to secure its territory. Hence, the military 
was seen by society as a pillar of stability and the only way to support national interests 
and goals. This is very much due to the expectations that the Bulgarian army will 
provide the liberation of ~he territories and Bulgarian population, which remained under 
the occupation of all the neighbors of the country after the unjust Berlin Treaty of 1878. 
Examples of numerous sacrifices by the Bulgarian soldiers and officers consolidated this 
general positive tendency and attitude toward the armed forces of the country. 
This positive record, however, is paralleled by several cases of the use of the 
military as an instrument of political terror against its own people in 1923, 1925, and 
especially in the 1941-44 period. Between the 20's and 40's the armed forces have 
"entertained" the experience of fascist totalitarian ideological attitudes. After that an 
ideologically driven system of a totalitarian socialist type replaced the previous one. 
Traditionally, the military had been involved in domestic political struggles. For 
example the Military League exerted strong political influence after World War I. This 
professional organization was created after W orId War I with the main goal to protect the 
social status of its members. Well organized and disciplined, it took a leading role in 
59 It is counted from the creation of the state in 1878 to the end of the WWII in 1945. 
60 For example the Balkans Wars. 
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overthrowing the government and establishing Zveno authoritarian regime.61 
In September 1944 military factions of Zveno, participated again in toppling 
Muraviev's cabinet. From the end of the Second World War until the revolution in 1989, 
the Bulgarian army served the political interests of the Bulgarian Communist Party. 
B. APRIL 1965 
An interesting episode in the civil-military relation's domain occurred in, 1965 
when the military officers were involved in political intrigue. The reported 1965 coup 
attempt led by an army general was allegedly aimed at replacing the communist leader 
Todor Zhivkov and establishing a more nationalist, less pro-Soviet leadership in the 
country.62 The coup was not well prepared and its organizers were captured and put in 
jail before its outbreak. General Todorov was reported to have committed suicide, or 
been killed in prison. Others were sentenced to different terms of imprisonment. 
But the coup attempt was not harmless. Among its organizers was the 
Commander of the Sofia military garrison and other top officials in the government 
administration. They had a plan and loyal military units ready to fulfil it. The coup's 
goal was to establish a more independent model of socialism, and probably that is why 
the Soviet military intelligence had a primary interest in revealing the conspiracy.63 
61 See Curtis, p. 238. 
62 J.F. Brown, The Challenge to Soviet Interests in Eastern Europe: Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, The 
Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, December 1986, p. 3. 
63 There is very limited information available about the coup. One accessible is the book of Paul Lendvai 
Eagles in Cobwebs, Garden City, New York, Doubleday & Company, 1969, pp. 286-297. 
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Obviously, this coup attempt registered another involvement of the Bulgarian military in 
politics and remained unique in the socialist state's history. 
c. THE FRUSTRATED BULGARIAN REFORM 
The so-called period of "perestroika," initiated in the Soviet Union and later 
adopted mostly as a slogan in Bulgaria, did not bring any change in Bulgarian civil-
military relations. On the contrary, during the years of the Soviet "perestroika," the 
image of the armed forces as a burden to the state started to emerge.64 
The process of undermining the military component of civil-military relations 
continued after the changes of 1989-90. The result was a dramatic deprivation of the 
military's guaranteed social status and stability. Nevertheless, a process of realization of 
. how civil-military relations in a democratic society should look like assumed a clearer 
vision after the adoption of the Armed Forces and Defense Act. 65 
In the last decade, Bulgaria's army shifted from a highly politicized to a 
depoliticized one. By 1995 Bulgaria had made more progress in separating the military 
from politics than the Soviet Union, but perhaps less progr,ess than other communist 
countries of Eastern Europe such as Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic. 
The first steps were taken with the prohibition of any political activity by the 
Army and the eradication of the party cells inside the Army. No doubt, the country's 
64 See ISIS - Research Report, Plamen Pantev, "The New National Security Environment and Its Impact 
on the Civil-Military Relations in Bulgaria." 17 Ju197. Available [Online]: 
<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isis/resrep05.htm>. 12 Februaryl998. 
65 Armed Forces and Defense Act, Adopted 22 December 1995, Amended 16 December 1997, State 
Gazette, Volume 112, Sofia, 27 December 1995. 
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elite increasingly understood that the military must be refonned in order to meet the 
requirements of the new political situation. 
As in other Eastern European countries, the purpose of Bulgaria's defense refonn, 
has been to establish democratic civilian command and control over the defense ministry 
and the Bulgarian People's Anny. It also had to clarify the lines of authority between the 
President and government (Prime minister and civilian defense minister) in peacetime 
and in wartime. 
Finally, the refonn had to remove Communist Party influence from the military 
establishment. Under the old system, Bulgarian national security policy was formulated 
by a small group headed by the Party's First Secretary, with perhaps the addition of the 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces and the defense minister. Until October 1991 
every Minister of Defense had been a high-ranking officer. Although, as expressed by 
the former Minister of Defense Valentin Aleksandrov: 
The Minister was senior in rank, but he was addressed not as 
'Comrade Army General' but as 'Comrade Minister.' In other words, is 
post, not his rank was paramount. 66 
The Minister was a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
and a political figure very close to the Party Leadership. 
The first civilian Minister of Defense - Dimitar Ludjev - was appointed by the 
UDF government in 1991. Since then appointments of the civilian Minister of Defense 
have become a tradition, and after December 1995 even a binding law.67 This notion 
66 "Aleksandrov Denies Conflict With Gen. Petrov," Sofia KONTINENT. 29 July 1994. FBIS Daily 
Report-Eastern Europe; 3 August 1994, FBIS-EEU-94-149. Aleksandrov was the Minister of Defense 
from December 1992 to June 1994. 
67 Defense and Armed Forces Act, Art.34, Par. 2 and 3. 
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had a further development in 1997 when this article was amended to state that not only 
the Minister but also his deputies should be civilians. 
In April 1992 Alexander Stalijski replaced Minister Ludjev. He kept this post 
until the fall of the UDF's government in December 1992, when Valentin Aleksandrov 
was appointed as a member of Berov's cabinet. Both, Stalijski and Aleksandrov, were 
lawyers and put a lot of efforts in framing a new Armed Forces and Defense Act. But the 
governments, in which they participated, couldn't endure and lacked the parliamentarian 
support that would have allowed them to act decisively in implementing a military 
reform. The BCP's government who took the office on December 1994 appointed retired 
Admiral Dimiter Pavlov as Defense Minister, thus repeating the Hungarian mode1.68 
Pavlov declared his commitment to hasten military reform and expedite the 
Armed Forces and Defense Act adoption. Although Pavlov had no visible success in the 
first mission, he was able to accelerate the process of the preparation of the bill. Ba~ked 
by the socialist's majority in Parliament, and actively supported by the Head of the 
parliamentarian National Security Committee, the Armed forces and Defense Act was 
adopted in December 1995. No doubt, this law was a right step in the long process of the 
configuration of new civil-military relations in Bulgaria. 
In February 1997, as a result of the Videnov government's incompetence to rule, 
the President appointed an interim government. George Ananiev, former Deputy 
Minister of Defense in the first UDF government, became Minister of Defense, keeping 
this office in Kostov's government, too. 
68 Retired Colonel Keleti was appointed Minister, of Defense 'after Hungarian Socialist Party victory. 
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With the probable exception of Minister Pavlov, all other civilian ministers had 
their "decisive battles" with the General Staff. Former Minister Stalijski will be 
remembered for his Ministerial Order 332, that trieq. to limit senior promotions only for 
persons graduated from military schools with at least four years curriculum. This order 
was indirectly a threat to the Chief of Staff, Army General Lyuben Petrov, and many 
other high-ranking officers. The conflict was settled, simply because Stalijski had not 
enough time and a strong mind to act decisively. After he left the office, the head of the 
Personnel Policy Department, COL Rousev, was dishonorably discharged because of his 
involvement in this case. Ironically, the ministerial order by which he was discharged 
was one of the first of the new Minister of Defense Aleksandrov that marked the so-
called "pink" period between him and the Chief of Staff, Army General Luben Petrov. 
Boyko Noev69, deputy mini"ster of defense in Berov's government, and interim 
minist~r at the end of 1994, also had "tough" days with a high-ranking officer. That was 
Major General Lilko Iotzov, Deputy Attorney General and Head of the military Attorney 
General Office. The main issues this time were the questions of the corruption within the 
military, and the efficiency of the Military Attorney General Office. As a result of this 
conflict the general ~as dismissed, but no official investigation on the alleged corruption 
was involved. 
Several times the reason for a direct conflict between Minister and Chief of Staff 
w,as the issue of the reduction of the personnel and particularly within the Officer Corps. 
A similar conflict was the reason for the sharp contradiction between Army General 
Petrov and Minister of Defense Aleksandrov. 
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In August 1994, it became clear that 812 officers would be discharged with the 
autumn reshuffle in the army. Army General Petrov submitted a list of 401 officers to the 
minister who are indispensable and who must be kept in the army despite having reached, 
the retirement age. Most of those officers were colonels who have already reached this 
age. The Comprehensive Military Service Act adopted in 1958 provided that the age 
limit for generals is 60, for colonels 50 and for lieutenant colonels 45 years.?O In this 
sense Aleksandrov's moves were completely according to the law that was in force. 
It was understandable that the BSP initiated all available resources to protect 
those officers that were seen as a "last generation of Bulgarian officers for whom a strong 
imagination is needed in order to believe in their depoliticization.,,71 However, the 
problem is not also political but rather economic. It is difficult to adapt to a pension after 
years of receiving a colonel's wage. Furthermore, the discharged colonels had no chance 
of finding another work after retirement. Obviously the problem had several dimensions 
and should be solved bearing in mind not only legal but political, social, and personal 
constraints. Finally, Minister Aleksandrov discharged the colonels, only to be ousted 
himself a couple of months later, in December 1994, when the socialists formed their 
government headed by Zhan Videnov. The new government had clearly in mind the 
69 Currently Mr. Noev is a Bulgarian representative in NATO. 
70 Genadi Popov, "BSP Leader Calls for Aleksandrov's Resignation," Sofia, DUMA, 24 August 1994, 
FBIS Daily Report-Eastern Europe, EEU-94-168, 30 August 1994. 
71 Konstantin Subtchev, "Colonel's Discharge Called Economic Problem," Sofia, KONTlNENT, 24 
August 1994, FBIS Daily Report-Eastern Europe. EEU-94-168, 30 August 1994. 
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problem of the retirement age, because in the new Defense and Armed Forces Act they 
provided an extended retirement age for the colonels.72 
Although civilian ministers entertained several victories in the process of gaining 
a political control over the Armed Forces, those steps were not completely successful. 
On of the reasons for that result was the lack of adequately competent experts in the 
national security area of politics. 
During the past two years military leaders in key positions in the Ministry of 
Defense have stepped out for civilians, but there is still an imbalance in terms of 
knowledge and skills in security issues. This characteristic of the process of imposing 
democratic civilian control over the military is common to all post-communist states. As 
Jeffrey Simon noted, the same problem emerged in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech 
Republic.73 
Since the presence of competent civilians at all levels in the ministry is essential, 
efforts were made to create a research and training center within the Bulgarian Ministry 
of Defense. Its main goal was to educate civilians in security matters. In addition, 
several Non Governmental Organizations as the Atlantic Club, the Center of Study of 
Democracy, and the Open Society play important roles in exchanging ideas and 
information, and organizing seminars, round table discussions and public lectures on 
security issues. 
72 Defense and Armed Forces Act, Art.l27, Par.l provides 56 years age limit for colonel's service. 
73 See Simon, p. 165. 
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The second reason for not imposing effective civilian oversight over the military 
in the period of 1989-1995 was a lack of clear regulations and understanding of how the 
mechanism of such control should work. 
Prior to February 27, 1996 when the new Defense and Armed Forces Act was put 
in force, the only nonnative base for military activities was an "ancient" Comprehensive 
Military Service Act, adopted in 1958. Obviously, this legal act was not prepared to meet 
the needs of the new reality of the 1990' s. Hence, the Ministry of Defense desperately 
needed a legal basis for the military refonn. This basis was expected also from the 
military, connected with the hope that society will finally direct its efforts toward the 
building of a more professional and better-equipped armed forces. 
Several months after the adoption of the Anned Forces and Defense Act the 
Council of Ministers (the Government) issued Regulations for Professional Military 
Service74 that was planned to set military reductions and promotions, social status of the 
personnel, and means of disciplinary sanctions. It was issued in order to supplement the 
Armed Forces and Defense Act and to develop further its principles. In addition, the 
Regulation of Financial Services in the Ministry of Defense was also issued. Thus, the 
military management had sufficient legal tools for implementing its refonns at last. 
However, a significant amount of valuable time was wasted in the developmental 
process. 
74 Rules for Professional Military Service, State Gazette, Volume 54, Sofia, 25 June 1996. 
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D. MINISTRY OF DEFENSE 
The defense ministry is comprised of three deputy defense ministers plus the 
Chief of the General Staff, who according to a June 1997 draft amendment, would 
become a deputy defense minister directly subordinate to the defense minister.75 As 
Simon noted, Bulgaria's huge defense ministry (of roughly 2,000~2,200 plus a General 
Staff of 700) still lacks sufficiently trained personnel and the capacity to perform 
effective basic functions such as transparent multi-year budgeting, long-term defense 
planning, and personnel management. 7 6 
The specific functions (directorates) appear to have shifted so often that it is very 
difficult to assess the effectiveness of communication between civilian defense ministry 
bodies and the General Staff directorates.?7 A typical example is the relationship 
between the Personnel Policy Directorate in the Ministry ·of Defense and almost identical 
structure within the General Staff. Although the ministry framed the basic principles 
upon which the promotions and reductions should be made, the General Staff Personnel 
directorate was in fact entitled to implement these principles without allowing sufficient 
oversight. This problem emerged in 1992, continued in 1993-1995, and still has the 
potential to hamper effective civilian control over promotions within the Officer Corps. 
75 Jefrey Simon, "Bulgaria arid NATO: 7 Lost Years," Strategic Forum, May 1998, National Defense 
University, pp. 1-4. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Simon, "Bulgarian and NATO; 7 Lost Years""p. 2. 
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The Ministry of Defense's structure, shown on Figure 2, maintained the same 
components that had been establish between December 1991 and May 1992, under 
Minister Ludjev.79 
As Simon noted, it is difficult to determine accountability and to identify where 
the responsibility lies for the long-term budget program connected to long-term planning, 
between defense planning and economic resources. Further, the link should be made 
between the personnel policy performed under the Deputy Defense Minister responsible 
78 Following figure represents a structure of leadership of the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense as it look 
liked in 1997. The Source is "Bulgarian Armed Force," Ministry of Defense, Public Relations Directorate, 
Sofia, 1997, p. 3. 
79 See Figure 2 on the next page. 
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of the personnel and the personnel directorate under the First Deputy Chief of the General 
Staff. 80 
In sum, compared to the defense ministries of the other post -communist states in 
transition, Bulgaria's ministry is extremely large with a very confusing structure. 
Bulgaria's 3,000 person (civilian and military) defense structure is roughly twice the size 
of Poland; though Bulgaria's 107,000 troops are roughly one-half of Poland's 218,000 
troops.81 Particularly, t~e size of the Ministry increased in 1995-1996, when several 
directorates were greatly enlarged.82 That was partially due to the lack of understanding 
of how this administrative unit had to be developed. Even now there is still not a 
nonnative regulation concerning the structure of the Ministry of Defense, which is in 
sharp contrast with almost all the administrative bodies of the state mechanism. This 
allowed several reshapings of the ministerial structure, although not in the sense of 
approving its management. 
As Szemerkenyi asserts, the bureaucratic mechanisms that implement top-level 
decisions, prepare the background work with other ministries, link the Minister of 
Defense's responsibilities to the military command and communicate the military's needs 
to the Minister are essential if civilian control is to be effective.83 Otherwise, ministerial 
legitimacy can be undennined by a lack of efficient public administrators. That is why 
80 Simon, "Bulgarian and NATO: 7 Lost Years," p. 3. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Those were especially International Cooperation and Personnel Policy Directorates. 
83 Reka Szemerkenyi, Central European Civil-Military Reforms At Risk, Oxford, New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1996, p. 11. 
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framing a robust, effective, and legally enforced structure is an issue of paramount 
importance. The reform within the armed forces although proclaimed in 1991, has not 
yet really begun. In the fall of 1991 the Bulgarian Armed Forces (BAF) totaled 107,000 
(with 46,000 professionals) and it remains at that leve1.84 
The current government approved the three stages of the Defense Reform that 
envisions cutting the military to 65,000 maximum by 2010. The main points in the 
program were the downsizing of the personnel and augmentation of professionalism. 
Although not very successful in the beginning, the process of recruitment of professional 
soldiers was initiated in September 1997. During 1998 Bulgaria plans to enlist roughly 
another 1,700-2,000 professionals in the Armed Force, mainly in the units that are 
planned to participate in South European Peacekeeping Forces.85 The second important 
issue in this program is the creation ofa Rapid Reaction Corps that is programmed· to 
have 70 percent manning and 100 percent equipment. The final stages of the reform are 
perceived to be fulfilled in 2010, when the Armed Forces should reach 65,000 men. 
Thus, Bulgaria is only at the beginning of a really painful and sensitive military reform. 
In contrast, Hungary already has reduced its forces from 120,000 to 52,000; Poland from 
405,000 to 218,000; the Czech Republic from 130,000 to 58,000.86 
Bulgaria's defense budget has been constantly reduced. The International 
Monetary Fund, which supervises firmly all government expenditures, discourages any 
84 Simon, "Bulgarian and Nato: 7 Lost Years," p. 4. 
85 This initiative of the states from South Europe is almost on its final stage. It is planned for Bulgaria to 
participate with an engineer company within the multinational brigade comprised by Turkish, Greeks, 
Romanian, and Macedonian units. 
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increase in the defense budget that will be needed for successful military reform. The 
1998 Defense budget of 487.45 billion leva (roughly 2 percent of GDP) allocates roughly 
25 billion leva (about U.S. $14 million) for troop relocation and military reform. 
Bulgaria. rrilitary expendture 1988-97 
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Figure 3. Bulgaria's Military Expenditure 1988-1997:87 
As Figure 3 displays, this amount is in sharp contrast with the amounts that were 
usually spent in the 80's, although, as was pointed out, the manpower was reduced only 
insignificantly. Therefore, the budget remains an important constraint in carrying out the 
modern and successful military reform in Bulgaria. 
The participation of Bulgarian's Forces in 'peacekeeping operations was an 
expression of the country's desire for a more active role in the world community's efforts 
towards peaceful settlement of disputes. The beginning was made in 1992 when Bulgaria 
86 Ibid. 
87 The source is "Bulgaria, military expenditure 1988-97," SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 
Available [Online]: hup://www.sipri.se/cgi-binlbackend/milex.pl?coun-Bulgaria, 11 September 1998. 
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participated in the UN operation in Cambodia (UNT AC) with a full contingent of an 
infantry battalion, military observers, staff officers and military policemen. In addition to 
this operation, the Bulgarian military served missions in Angola, Tadjikistan, and just 
recently an engineer platoon joined Dutch troops in SFOR under NATO command. In 
July 1998, in addition to the engineer platoon a transportation unit was sent under Greek 
command to participate in SFOR. 
Bulgaria signed th.e framework document of the initiative Partnership for Peace in 
1994 and became an active participant in this program. For example, only in 1997, 
Bulgarian units and personnel participated in 22 joint exercises within the Partnership for 
Peace, two times being a host. 88 
Following the new government's foreign policy, the Ministry of Defense initiated 
a package of measures in order to fulfil the Council of Ministers' Decision 192 from 
February 17, 1997, to seek full NATO membership. The National Program for the 
preparation of Bulgaria's accession to NATO was adopted. The part of this document 
concerned with Ministry of Defense activities provided eight different groups of activities 
that would enhance the chances for Bulgaria's accession. They included: updating the 
Individual Partnership Program (IPP) between Bulgaria and NATO for 1997-1999; active 
and responsible participation in pap Planning and Review Process (P ARP); achieving 
maximum interoperability with Allied Forces; and reviewing the Concept for Military 
Reform 1996-2010 in the light of the requirements for possible NATO membership. All 
those steps aimed in the right direction but were made too late, depriving Bulgaria of the 
88 The Source is Bulgarian Armed Force, Ministry of Defense, Public Relations Directorate, Sofia, 1997, 
p. II. 
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chances to be among the invited countries at the Madrid Summit. Nevertheless, NATO 
membership is the main objective of Bulgarian diplomacy, and lot of efforts and 
resources are devoted to this goal. 
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IV. POLITICAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
As one of the scholars of Central European civil-military relations put it: 
Democratization, the introduction of basic democratic principles 
into security and defense policy making, begins through legal means.89 
In order to have effective civilian control, a nation must establish a system or 
mechanism of administration, which makes this control possible. The establishment of 
this mechanism is an organizational and legal task which includes the modernization of 
defense planning and budgeting (a system enabling Parliament and the government to 
exercise their powers), the adopting of a law defining the rights and obligations of 
military personnel, and the determination of accounting techniques. 
If this mechanism exists and works as an expression of the will of the whole 
society,. the military must be subordinate to the entire governmental structure, not simply 
to the President or Prime Minister who exercises command. Divided control does contain 
dangers. The military could playoff civilian authorities against each other to exaggerate 
military influence. 
Accountability to parliament or to the legislature implies accountability to the 
people. It demands public discussion of defense, justification of military budgets, the 
investigation of mistakes and crimes. 
As the Hungarian Rudolf 100 asserts: 
89 Reka Szemerkenyi, p. 2. 
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Democratic control removes the temptation for the armed forces to 
intervene in party politics, taking sides or enhancing their position. The 
rule of law should therefore include clear norms, strong institutions and 
mechanisms that delineate unambiguously the limits of authority of the 
various actors, and also preclude any amalgamation of roles, and 
consequently ideological and political aspects must be eliminated from the 
activities of the military. Being neutral and non-partisan, the military 
officer can serve several successive governments. He serves the state, and 
the duly constituted (elected or appointed) state authority, and not just one 
segment of the political establishment. 90 
Actively exercised, parliamentary power over the military contributes to 
transparency in military affairs that actually strengthens national defense by reinforcing 
military identification with the people and popular identification with the military. The 
judiciary plays a supporting, but indispensable role, holding military individuals 
personally accountable in ways that prevent military interference in politics. 
Developing controllable armed forces and a system of internal administration in 
accord with the principle of civilian control is an important goal. Therefore, effective and 
long-lasting results can be reached if there is a solid and well-developed legal basis. 
A. INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED IN NATIONAL SECURITY UP TO 1991 
The Communist Party has long dominated the Bulgarian national security 
decision-making process. The Party possessed ultimate authority in every single area of 
the public life, including national security. The Constitution of 1971 gave the power over 
defense and national security to the State Council and it's specialized organ in that sphere 
90 Rudolf Joo, The Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Institute for Security Studies, Paris, February 
1996, p. 4. 
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- the State Committee of Defense.91 As part of the State Council, which was the most 
powerful state institution, the State Committee of Defense, shown on Figure 4, 
commanded all the governmental structures that had prerogatives related to national 
security. In practice, however, the State Committee of Defense "was merely a rubber 
stamp for the Politburo,,92 because this state organ never exercised independent 
decisions, other than those provided from the Party's Central Committee. 
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ICentralC ommittee of the Bulgarian I State Council 
I (State Committee of Defense-DKO) I (MC ommunist Party ilitary Department) ! 
Council of Ministers l-
I 
I I I 
I Ministry of Interior Min istry of D efen se Ministry of Foreign 
I Affairs 
Figure 4. Defense Policy Decision-Making in Bulgaria 1970-198993 
91 Galina Chuleva and Jim Derleth, "The Bulgarian National Security Decision-Making Apparatus 1970-
1994," European Security, Volume.3, No.4, Winter 1994, Franc Cass, London, p. 775. 
92 Ibid. p. 776. 
93 The source is Chuleva and Derleth article. 
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The legal basis for the Party's supremacy was Article 1, section 2 of the 1971 
Constitution, which stipulated that the Bulgarian Communist Party (BKP) was the 
"guiding force in the society and the State. ,,94 This provision gave opportunity to the 
Party to control the entire state structure. There was a Military Department of the Central 
Committee of the BKP that duplicated the functions of the State Committee of 
Defense.95 It was a real decision-making body in the area of national security that 
shaped personnel policy, the defense budget, and directed the intelligence services. The 
chairman of the Military Department was a Politburo member who had direct lines of 
communications with the General Secretary of the BKP. 
Changes in the political leadership in November 1989 caused changes in the 
institutional framework of the state. In the beginning of 1990, the 1971 Constitution was 
substantially amended and the State Council was abolished. In its place, a presidential 
institution was established. The Presidency inherited the powers of the State Council in 
the area of national security. The amended Constitution provided also for the creation of 
an advisory body called the National Security Council (NSC) chaired by the President.96 
Neither the Constitution nor any other law contained' provisions concerning the 
structure, functions, and NSC's membership. Because of these ambiguities the National 
94 "Bulgarian Constitutions from 1879 to 1991," Available [Online]: <http://parliament.b!!/constl971.htm, 
October 31, 1998. 
95 In Bulgarian it is Durzhaven Komitet po Otbrana or DKO. 
96 See Figure 3 in the Appendix. 
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Security Council functioned in an informal way97 during Zhelyu Zhelev's first 
presidency. 
The new Council was totally different from its predecessor - State Committee of 
Defense (DKO) - in both membership and responsibilities. The DKO was predominantly 
formed by military officers, such as the Minister of Defense, Minister of the Interior, the 
Head of the Intelligence Service, and the Chief of the General Staff. Conversely, the 
NSC had a strong parliamentary representation. This was an indicator of a new trend in 
Bulgarian politics, the move from concentration of powers in the State Council towards a 
decentralized decision-making authority. The NSC functioned as a consultative body to 
the President and was described as "something like a round table on the questions of 
National security.,,98 
The lack of clearly defined responsibilities, areas of interest, and the absence of 
legitimate authority hindered NSC's work. Designed with the notion to balance views of 
different bodies, who shared prerogatives in assuring the state's national security, NSC 
was active but not able to take decisive steps in shaping the national security doctrine. 
Partially, this was the result of the diverse political landscape and the unwillingness of 
the opposite parties to reach a consensus on the major issues regarding national security. 
In addition, the lack of the relevant legal basis for shaping NSC's prerogatives and its 
interrelations with the Parliament and the Council of Ministers contributed to its inability 
97 Chuleva and Derleth, p. 778. 
98 Dimitar Yonchev, "The challenge Called National Security," Kontinent, 29 October 1993, p. 16. 
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to fonn a national security doctrine and to support the adoption of the new Armed Forces 
and Defense Act. 
B. PRESIDENTIALISM OR PARLIAMENTARISM 
The powers related to civilian control over the armed forces found a new 
development in the 1991 Constitution, and in the 1995 Anned Forces and Defense Act. 
In 1997, this legal basis was elaborated further when the Defense and Anned Forces Act 
was substantially amended. The result was a better implementation of the principles of 
civilian control over military and improved division of the power structure at the 
government level. 
A post-communist constitution was adopted in July 1991, providing for a multi-
party system, free elections on the basis of universal adult franchise, and specific human 
and civil rights. The legislators chose a parliamentary type of leadership. As Linz and 
Stepan argued "the parliamentary organizational fonn gives the political system 
significant advantages over presidentialism."99 This notion can open a broad space for 
discussion, which is particularly important for societies engaged in the transition to 
democracy, because framing the new institutional and legal framework is a recourse and 
time consuming goal. 
The type of political system of democracy chosen by a state in transition becomes 
of paramount importance for civil-military relations., The two types of institutional 
99 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, p. 141. 
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framework, presidentialism or parliamentarianism, were chosen by all Eastern European 
countries in their endeavor to consolidate their democracy. 
The U.S.A. is an example of a presidential system that is characterized by a 
powerful presidential office, with the President elected directly by the people, a fixed 
term in office, and the power of veto that can not easily be overthrown. The American 
President can initiate and propose legislation and is Commander in Chief with supreme 
prerogatives related to the armed forces. 1 00 
The main advantage of a presidential system is executive stability, based on the 
president's fixed term of office and democratic, direct elections that provide straight 
relations and responsibility between the President and his voters. One of the main 
disadvantages of a presidential system is related to possible "executive-legislature 
deadlocks,,101 when the President is opposed by a different majority party within the 
legislature. Another disadvantage can be the possible concentration of power in one 
person, mainly because authoritarian tendencies may emerge. 
The opposite case occurs when there are dual executives - a President and a Prime 
Minister as head of the government. When the President has only limited or ceremonial 
prerogatives we have a parliamentarian. institutional system. This system is characterized 
by the existence of a government as a collective body, and an indirectly elected Prime 
Minister, being a leader of the majority party. Another typical characteristic of this 
system is the formal appointment of the Prime Minister by the Head of State, and the 
100 The US Constitution, Art. II, Section 2. 
101 Keith Crawford, East Central European politics today, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 
1996, p. 281. 
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government's responsibility to the legislature. The existence of the government is 
primarily dependent upon maintaining the Parliament's confidence. The term of the 
government is fixed in principle (in Bulgaria it is four years), but the legislature can 
remove its confidence, thus dooming the government. 
When the president and premier share responsibilities and prerogatives one has to 
speak of a semi-presidential political system. Usually, the president can exercise greater 
influence and power when a large parliamentary majority backs him. 102 Otherwise the 
position of the Prime Minister strengthens. In this type of governmental system the 
President is elected directly by the people, thus providing sufficient democratic 
legitimacy. The President is elected for a fixed term and he can not be removed from 
office except for strictly fixed criminal acts. Sometimes, such presidents have a right to 
chair the cabinet meetIngs, can frame the. foreign and defense policy and have emergency 
powers: 
In the post-communist countries pure parliamentarian political systems can be 
found only in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 103 Within East European 
states in transition, there are no pure presidential political systems. Most of these states 
are using the semi-presidential form of government. 
The advantages of semi-presidentialism include the stability of the system, 
because either the President or the Prime Minister is in charge, which means that it is 
al~ost impossible to have powerlessness. Another advantage is the democratic 
102 As President de Gaulle, 1958-69 and Mitterrand 1981, p. 86. 
103 Crawford, p. 289. 
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legitimacy of the President, who may act as a intermediary in partisan quarrels. The 
disadvantages of this system encompass the opportunity of the emergence of 
authoritarian tendencies, when the President is backed by overwhelming majority in the 
legislature,104 and the probable clash of the two offices, especially when the President 
and Prime Minister represent different political parties. 
An important prerogative of the President is the power of veto. Generally, in the 
semi-presidential type of government, the President exercises this right limited to 
returning the disputed law to Parliament for further discussion, as in Bulgaria, Hungary 
and Slovakia. In Poland the President has considerably bigger authority, even the power 
of a second veto. 105 
Although the Constitution of 1991 proclaimed Bulgaria a state with· a 
parliamentarian form of government, the distinctive elements of the semi-presidentialism 
can easily be found. In the following section the argument shall be made that 
parliamentarism stepped out in favor of semi-presidentialism in Bulgaria. This was 
partially a result of political rivalry between the two major parties BSP and UDP that 
caused governmental changes almost every year since 1990. ' Thus, the only institution 
that remained untouched and stable was the President's office. It helped to elevate the 
President's role from arbiter and moderator to an active actor on the political scene, 
assuring him a great deal of admiration and credibility. Therefore, it is not strange that 
the President office constantly gains public confidence and has the highest ranks in public 
104 Ibid., p. 285. 
105 Ibid. p. 295. 
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opinions pools. 1 06 This new role of the President raised the importance of the institution 
and made it an attractive electoral goal. That is why the two presidential campaigns that 
the Bulgarians witnessed (in January 1992 and November 1996) were rather intense. 
Both elections had to be decided in two electoral rounds, and in the case of Zhelyu 
Zhelev (who won the elections in 1992) the difference between the loser and the winner 
was small. 
c. THE PRESIDENT 
In every modern republic, the Constitution proclaims the President 1 07 to be the 
Head of State. This is also the case in Bulgaria, where the President is directly elected 
every five years for a maximum of two terms. The authority conferred by direct election 
and the demands deriving from the challenges of transition mean that the presidency is 
much more influential than prescribed in the Constitution. Zhelyu Zhelev's role 108 as 
President was important in bringing down the Dimitrov government, and Petur Stoyanov 
(elected in November 1996) was a key figure in resolving the crisis of early 1997. Thus, 
the political instability and economic crisis brought about the Presidential Office's 
abilities to act as a moderator between political rivals. 
The President also has undisputed authority as the commander-in-chief of the 
armed forces. Although he has no direct links to the armed forces, as Figure 5 makes 
106 See Figure 5 and Table 2 in the Appendix. 
107 Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, Art.92, p. l. 
108 Zhelev was the first free elected President in January 1992. 
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visible, he is entitle of important prerogatives in the national security sphere. For 
example, he declares mobilization and state of war, and confers higher military ranks. 109 
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He also acquires a considerable role in foreign policy and diplomacy. As the 
highest-ranking official in the state, he is empowered to appoint and dismiss the higher 
command of the Armed Forces on a motion from the Council of Ministers. 1 1 0 In fact, 
the person may be appointed to a senior office, or command, or be promoted to the 
highest military rank only when both the Council of Ministers and the President 
agree. lll 
109 Ibid., Art. p. 98. 
110 Ibid. Art.100, p. 2. 
111 See M. Mae Johnson, "Civil-Military Relations and Military Reform in Bulgaria," European Security, 
Autumn 1995, and pp. 488-518. , • 
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There were several examples when the candidates approved by the Council of 
Ministers for high military posts were not accepted by the President. This situation may 
be repeated in the future, exclusively because political diversity and confrontation is 
strongly present in the Bulgarian society. 
For example, in December 1996 a Bulgarian military prosecutor announced that 
there is evidence, which proves that the UDF headquarters had been bugged. The fact 
that military prosecutors are dealing with this case support accusations that spying on the 
Opposition coalition was organized by the Interior Ministry security services. 112 The 
political struggle gained dimensions that required involvement of all forces available, 
even use of official non-partisan institutions. 
Since July 1990, when Zhelyu Zhelev was appointed as interim President, till 
January 1997 when he left the office he had worked with six governments. Only one of 
these governments was formed by UDF and other two had their representatives in several 
posts. Others were either exclusively BSP governments, as Lukanov's in 1990 and 
Videnov's in 1994-1996, or very strongly influenced by them as Berov's in 1992-1994. 
So, during most of his presidency Zhelev' had to cope with governments that were 
everything but supportive. l13 These contradictions were particularly visible in the areas 
of foreign policy and national defense. 
112 "Prosecutor Confirms Bugging of Opposition Headquarters A Bulgarian Military Prosecutor Says 
Today." 17 January 1997, Available [Online]: 
http://www.frerl.org/ncainews/J9961N.RU.961219174939.htm1. 12 February 1998. 
113 The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd. "Bulgaria -Politics" November 1, 1995. Available [LexislNexis]: 
EUROPE IBULGAR, 15 August 1998. 
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Zhelev stated clearly his position towards NATO membership, but the attitude of 
the BSP governments on this topic were ambiguous and wrapped with vague promises of 
further Euro-Atlantic integration. "The BSP is unequivocally for Bulgaria's membership, 
in NATO but a number of issues should be elucidated before that," 114 said Philip Bokov, 
one of the moderate BSP leaders. 
The President's prerogative to appoint diplomatic representatives115 was also a 
source of conflict between him and the government. 
The right of appointment of the high-ranking officers was and probably will be a 
serious constraint in Bulgarian civil-military relations, because it might be used as a 
bargaining chip between the President and the Government. In cases where there are no 
contradictions between these two institutions the President's authority in this area cannot 
endanger civil-military relations in Bulgaria. 
The most recent example of good cooperation between the President and the 
Government in imposing civilian control over the military is General Marin's case. 
Major General Angel Marin was appointed by the President as Commander of the 
Bulgarian Missile Forces in September 1997. In March 1998 at a press conference the 
general declared that the army reform wouldn't lead to a better army, and that NATO 
membership wouldn't improve its poor condition as a whole. 116 The President reacted 
firmly and requested the Prime Minister to suggest dismissal of the general, which was 
114 "Senior BSP Figure Poses Questions Over NATO Entry," BBC Monitoring Service: Eastern Europe, 
December 17,1994. Available [LexislNexis]: EUROPE IBULGAR, 15 August 1998. 
115 Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, Art.98, p. 6. 
57 
done immediately. The Defense Minister Annie also insisted that Marian be sacked and 
said he had broken the law by making political comments which ran against official 
policy and by refusing to implement military reforms. 1 17 The President's arguments 
were that the military had no right to challenge the governmental political decisions such 
as NATO membership. 
In order to fulfil efficiently his functions as Commander in Chief the President 
created a Military Cabinet in 1991. Originally it was comprised of three military officers 
(one from every branch of the Armed forces). The Cabinet was not a part of the 
command structure b·ut was ~esigned to act mostly as an advisory body. The events in 
recent years indicated that this apparatus might be further developed. 
Under Peter Stoyanov's presidency, the former Head of the General Staff Cabinet 
was appointed as the Head of the Military Cabinet, obviously for the reason to improve 
relationships between these two institutions. In the middle of 1997, when dismissed from 
his office, former Chief of Staff, General Colonel Totomirov, was also appointed as a 
Secretary of National Security to the President. This fact apparently elevated the 
importance of the Military Cabinet and gave to the President a sufficient team of 
experienced professionals that provided him with expertise in the military area. 
The recent Constitutional Court decisions on the topic of "Whether the President 
is a Supreme Commander-in-chief of the Armed forces of Republic of Bulgaria not only 
116 " Prezidentut uvolni General Marin," The President dismissed General Marin, Sofia, DEMOCRATIY A 
(12 March 1998) Available [Online]: http://www.democracia.com. 15 August 1998. 
117 "Bulgaria's missile chief dismissed over NATO," Reuters (17 March 1998) Available [Online]: 
http://www.db.online.bglb!!lbgar.ticle?artdate= 17.-MAR-98&artno=4, October 31, 1998. 
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in war, but also in peace time" 118 brought additional interpretation of this particular 
President's prerogative. According to this decision, Article 100 of the Constitution 
prescribes what the President's duties should be as a Supreme Commander-in-chief, 
without distinguishing between duties in times of war and peace. The court asserted that 
President keeps the quality of being Supreme Commander-in-Chief during the all his time 
in office. As a: chairman of the Consultative National Security Council the President has 
the right to require from the state institutions any information connected with national 
defense and security he deems necessary. Furthermore, the President may issue decrees 
and proclamations that may include recommendations he considers important for the 
state's national security. 
This court's interpretation will give new dimension to the President's prerogatives 
in the national security area. When President Zhelev held this office, his Military cabinet 
Head, Major General Dimitrov, tried to gain more access to comprehensive information 
concerning military activities. These efforts were met with resentment from the General 
Staff and had no success. The Constitutional Court's decision on Article 100 will give 
additional opportunity to the Pr.esident's Staff to collect and assess important information 
in the area of national security. This fact will contribute to the President's ability to 
perform efficiently his duties as Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces and will 
improve the implementation of the principles of civilian control over the military. 
Both, the Constitution and the Armed Forces and Defense Act, contain a special 
section that prescribes the President's prerogatives as Commander of the Armed Forces. 
118 State Gazette, Volume 113, Sofia, 30 September 1998, pp. 1-5. 
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The Armed Forces and Defense Act repeats the basic text of the Constitution that states 
the President is a Supreme Commander-in-chief,119 but also adds several important 
rights. For example, the President is entitled to approve strategic plans for Armed Forces 
activities, and declares a condition of higher readiness for the particular units or all of the 
Armed Forces.1 20 In a conflict situation, when there is a military attack against the 
country or in a fulfillment of international obligations 121 he can declare a war. These 
prerogatives the President possesses only when the Parliament is not in session. 
Otherwise, the Parliament holds these authorities. The President's act related to 
declaration of war is subject of immediate approval by the Parliament, thus exercising its 
controlling authorities. What is missing in the Constitution's regulations though, is what 
will happen if the National Assembly later refuses to endorse the declaration of war. 122 
The National Assembly has no initiating authority and has no right to declare a war if is 
not asked to do so by the President or the Council of Ministers. Therefore, good 
communications between these institutions is a prerequisite for effective work of the 
national security decision-making system.1 23 One of the ways such communication can 
be built is through the adopting of clear and transparent legal regulation that will cover all 
area of their responsibilities. 
119 Defense and Armed Forces Act, Art. 27-30. 
120 Ibid., Art. 28. 
121 This President's prerogative is particularly important in light of Bulgaria's potential participation in 
NATO. 
122 Jhonson, p. 497. 
123 See Figure 6 on the next page. 
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In the case of military conflict, the President forms a Supreme Command, a body 
that assists him with his Commander-in-chief duties. 124 The members of this body 
include the Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, Minister of the Interior, Foreign 
Minister, Minister of Transportation, Chief of the General Staff, and other officials 
appointed by the President. 
D. CONSULTATIVE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 
Another body, deeply involVed with the process of assuring national security, is 
the Consultative National Security Council. It was created in 1991, but fully developed 
in 1994 as a result of the adoption of a specific law.1 25 This body is chaired by the 
President and includes the Prime Minister, Chief of Staff, and Minister of Defense, 
Minister of Interior, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and other top state officials. The 
Council is empowered to consider a wide range of issues such as guarantees of civil 
peace, public order, internal and external politics related to national security, and the 
rights and interests of Bulgarian citizens. The Council has no decision-making authority 
and is only entitled to give recommendations. Until now, though, all its decisions were 
almost unconditionally accepted. 
124 Armed Forces and Defense Act, Art. 30. 
125 Consultative National Security Council Law, State Gazette, Volume 13, Sofia, 11 February 1994. 
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E. THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 
In any liberal democracy the Parliament as the legislative organ is the 
representative body of the people. Being directly elected, it possesses democratic 
legitimacy. Most of the post-communist countries in Eastern Europe drafted 
Constitutions that allow the Parliament controlling authority over the government and 
sometimes even over the President. This is not a surprise, bearing in mind the lack of 
democratic parliamentarian practice during the 45-year period of the communist rule and 
the people's desire to, " ... distance themselves from anything vaguely resembling the 
concentration of power under the communist regimes." 126 
According to the Bulgarian Constitution, the parliament consists of a unicameral 
240-seat National Asseinbly,127 directly elected for four years on the basis of 
proportional representation. Some of the post-communists countries in the region, like 
Albania, Hungary, Macedonia, and Slovakia also chose this model. 
Crawford characterized the Bulgarian Parliament as "democratically pluralist but 
chaotic,,128 between 1991-92· and "mildly authoritarian,,129 from late 1994 to 1996. 
The former one had no dominant party thus lacking party discipline that led to chronic 
governmental instability. This was the result mainly of the appearance of new 
126 Crawford, p. 289. 
127 Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, Art. 63. 
128 Crawford, p. 261. 
129 Ibid. 
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parliamentarian groups that tried to oust the government. The second one, dominated by 
BSP, had a strong party discipline backing the Prime minister who could entirely control 
the executive branch. 
The framers of the Electoral law in Bulgaria provided 4 percent of the popular 
vote for parties and electoral coalitions to qualify. Major constitutional change allows for 
the election of a larger Grand National Assembly. A simple parliamentary majority is 
required to approve a government, or Council of Ministers, which is headed by the Prime 
Minister. The same majority is required for adopting legislation. A three-quarters 
majority is needed for constitutional changes. 
The National Assembly is the sole legislative body in Bulgaria and has 
fundamental powers in the national security area. It is empowered to declare war and 
make peace, to authorize usage of the Armed Forces· outside the country, to allow 
stationing of foreign troops on Bulgarian territory or their passing through it, to ratify 
international treaties that have military nature, and to declare a state of emergency in the 
entire territory of the country. 130 National Assembly determines the total number of the 
Armed Forces, under motion of the Council of Ministers. The Parliament adopts the 
National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine, and can open or close military 
academies and schools. 131 
According to the Bulgarian Constitution, the National Assembly holds ultimate 
a"Qt~ority in approving any deployment and use of Bulgarian Armed Forces outside the 
130 Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, Art. 84-85. 
131 Defense and Armed Forces Act, Art. 26. 
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country's borders and the deployment of foreign troops on the territory of the country or 
their crossing of that territory. 132 The Constitution addressed the Parliament authority 
when foreign troops are involved, but did not have any explanation of how to deal with, 
transit of resources or equipment. The government decided to use the Civil Aviation Act 
and the Sea Space Act, which authorizes the Council of Ministers to take decisions. 
Members of the Parliament opposed the government's decision and claimed that this is 
the Parliament's responsibility. 
Because of the ambiguities related to the permission of foreign armed forces 
passing through the country, the Constitutional Court issued its Decision #6 on 12 July 
1994. 133 The particular reason for that was the UN request for moving armored personal 
vehicles through Bulgaria on their way to UNPROFOR troops stationed in Macedonia. 
The Constitutional Court interpreted Article 84 Section 11 from the Constitution in the 
sense that the Parliament is responsible for issuing permission only in case foreign troop 
deployment on Bulgarian territory or their crossing of it has a "military" or "military-
political purpose or character." The Court ruling didn't help much though, because still it 
wasn't clear if the participation in PfP exercises has a military-political or routine training 
character. As a result, all joint exercises on Bulgarian territory, or on the territory of a 
foreign country had to be sanctioned by the Parliament. 
From one point of view, that was an expression of the effective civilian oversight 
and parliamentarian control over the Armed Forces, but from another Parliamentarian 
132 Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, Art. 84, Section 11. 
133 Decision 6 of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Bulgaria, State Gazette, Volume 59, Sofia, 22 
July 1994. 
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decision for every case caused a lot of difficulties for the government. The procedure 
was too complicated and didn't make a distinction between the different forms of military 
cooperation, which flourished after 1991. This problem finally could be solved with the 
amendments of the Armed Forces and Defense Act in 1997, when the government 
received authority to send Bulgarian unarmed military units abroad for humanitarian, 
ecological, educational, sportive, and other tasks with peaceful (non-military) character. 
This made clear the importance of a sound legal basis for imposing civilian control over 
the military. 
The National Security Concept was adopted by the Parliament on April 16, 
1998. 134 In this document the main emphasis was put on Bulgaria's Euro-Atlantic 
integration. The Concept includes a political analysis of the region and prescribes the 
Bulgarian objectives for reaching effective protection of citizens, society and state from 
external and internal threats. According to this paper, the basic principles upon which the 







The lack of any territorial claims. 
Bulgaria's security building is not a threat against other countries. 
Bulgaria's expressed desire for NATO membership is not a threat to other 
countries. 
The Bulgarian priority is a policy of loyalty and mutual interest. 
Bulgaria's security is guaranteed by global and Euro-Atlantic structures 
for collective security. 
The national security is backed by Military Doctrine, which determines 
the building and the use of the Armed Forces. 
134 National Security Concept, State Gazette, No., 46, Sofia, 22 April 1998. 
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7. The Republic of Bulgaria is against any military or political Balkan 
unions. 135 
The main priority of the Bulgarian security policy is full NATO membership. 
The National Security Concept is the first document, adopted by Parliament, that stated 
clearly Bulgaria's affiliation with NATO and prescribed the future steps that have to be 
made in the process of accession. In its final section, the Concept describes the 
organization and the functions of the Bulgarian national security system. 
As a result, a new body in the system of the Bulgarian national security was 
created - the Security Council. It was constructed as an assistant body to the Council of 
Ministers, and consists of the Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior, Minister of 
Defense, Foreign Minister, their deputies, Chief of Staff, and the Heads of the 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services. The President can participate also, 
person~.lly or by his staff. He can ask for any information that he may need. 
The main functions· of the Security Council are to make the threat and security 
analysis, and to prepare and conduct crisis management and conflict management. This 
body shall also accumulate and prepare intelligence information for the main state 
institutions, such as the President, the Prime Minister, and the National Assembly. 
The Security Council consists of nearly the same members as the Consultative 
National Security Council, and some experts made comments about probable future 
c?nflicts between these two institutions. The Security Council though, has executive 
functions and will deal with day to day responsibilities of the government in the national 
security realm. Its function, to distribute national security related information to the 
135 Ibid., Art. 27-33. 
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President, the Prime Minister, and the Chairman of the National Assembly, underlines its 
importance. The creation of this body indicated that the institutional framework for 
national security decision-making is still not completed in Bulgaria. Only the efficient 
interaction between the parts of this still not tested structure will assure implementation 
of democratic civilian control over the armed forces. Otherwise it could create two 
centers of authority - one around the President, and one around the Prime Minister which 
- could cause problems for the military in terms of the political chain of command. 
Attached to the Parliament, the National Security Committee was created in 1991, 
to provide sufficient parliamentary control over the Armed Forces. Its members are 
parliamentarians that work on legal drafts and prepare evaluation reports on national 
security issues. However, in many cases the members of this Committee are not 
competent enough to address military topics,· because. parliamentarians with such a 
background and knowledge are rare.1 36 For example, the current Parliament (elect~d in 
1997) has a diversity of professions represented: engineers - 51, scientists - 50, doctors -
28, lawyers - 26, economist - 25, teachers - 13, journalists - 9, diplomats - 4, and others 
- 34137 among the latter only a few former officers from the Armed Forces. To have 
relative background in national security affairs is not necessarily a question of having 
been a member of the Armed Forces. This knowledge can also be attained by educational 
efforts in the field of defense and security politics. One should note that Bulgaria's 
political authorities have already started to carry out civil-military relations projects, both 
136 See also Simon, "Bulgaria in NATO:7 Lost Years," p. 3. 
137 "Union of Democratic Forces" Available [Online]: http://www.bild.acad.bg/udf/election. 5 September 
1998. I 
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with national and with international support in order to improve the level of expertise of 
the civil-military community. As far as this projects are concern these programs should 
intensify in the future using all possibilities within PfP and the opportunities, offered by 
the Center for Civil-Military Relations in Monterey, California. Another important point 
has to be seen in the opportunity to send abroad political and military members, who have 
influence in strategic security decision-making, abroad in order to let them participate in 
international educational programs related to military affairs. 
F. THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 
The Council of Ministers, or government, is responsible for public order and 
national security and exercises overall guidance of the state administration and the Armed 
Forces. 138 The government shapes and implements military policy and directs the usage 
of the military budget. The last amendment of the Defense and Armed Forces Act in 
1997 gave the Government wider prerogatives of sending unarmed troops on ex-
territorial missions when the purpose is humanitarian, educational, or other peaceful 
missions. Prior to that, every case has to be presented to the National Assembly for 
permission. 
The Constitution comprises no specific articles about the role of the Council of 
Ministers in national security decision making. Therefore, its prerogatives should be 
stated in the Armed Forces and Defense Act. No doubt that, as the highest executive 
body in the state, the government possesses a variety of rights in shaping national 
security. According to Article 32 of the Armed Forces and Defense Act, the government 
138 Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, Art.105. 
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guides and carries out the military politics of the state. It adopts the Bulgarian Army 139 
structure and plans the organizational building of the Anned Forces. It adopts the 
Regulations for Professional Military Service,140 and enacts the provisions that prescribe· 
the rights and obligations of the professional military personnel. These Regulations 
define the way of military promotion and the social protection measures applied to the 
military - from housing to medical care and retirement. 
The Regulations that are in force were adopted several months after the Armed 
Forces and Defense Act, in June 1996. This document introduced the contract type of 
professional military service, as a way to equalize the rights of military personnel with 
those of the other governmental officials. The Regulations define what kind of education 
and qualification is needed in order to receive a particular military rank. For example, 
one has to have a college degree from the military school or civilian university and 
additional courses for a particular position in order to be promoted to junior officer. In 
addition, the requirements for senior officers include a military academy 141 diploma. 
The promotions are based on the position? which the officer, NCO, or the soldier 
occupies, in the sense that one can get a promotion only if the position is defined for a 
particular military rank. In addition, the professional military man has to have a good 
result form the individual annual assessment process and a completed course for each 
particular position. Although the Regulations defined a mechanism for military 
139 Traditionally as an Army is perceived not only Ground Forces but NAVY and Air Force also. 
140 Regulations for Professional Military Service, State Gazette, Volume 54, Sofia, 25 June 1996. 
141 In Bulgarian military education tradition, the Military Academy is the institution that provides 
advanced officer education and training. 
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promotions, the attempt wasn't so successful. That is why, just recently, the government 
declared its intention to amend the existent Regulations for Professional Military Service 
in order to reduce the available high-ranking positions. 
The government has control authority over production and trade with military 
equipment and special production. It also organizes and supervises the mobilization of 
the Armed Forces. Furthermore it can adopt certain normative acts related to the Defense 
and Armed Forces. The government makes proposals to the President for the high 
military posts appointments and promotions. The government is obliged to present an 
annual report to Parliainent on the condition of Defense and Armed Forces. 142 
G. THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE 
The Minister of Defense is a civilian post. He heads the Ministry of Defense and 
implements decisions of the executive branch as far the Armed Forces are conce!1led. 
The first draft of the Armed Forces and Defense Act gave only limited authority to the 
Minister of Defense in terms of direct army guidance. The Minister was perceived as a 
political appointee and his primary duty was to transmit executive orders to the Chief of 
Staff. This situation changed significantly in 1997 as a result of the amendments to the 
Armed Forces and Defense Act. "The Minister guides the Ministry of Defense and 
Exercises civilian control over the Bulgarian Army," states Article 35 of the Armed 
Forces and Defense Act. He participates in shaping the Concept of the National Security 
and composes the military part of the state budget. The Minister is in charge of personnel 
policy and is responsible for manpowering of the Bulgarian Army. He runs the social 
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and economic policy of the Ministry of Defense and leads the international cooperation in 
the area of national security. Further, he makes proposals to the Council of Ministers for 
the appointment of the Chief of the General Staff. 14 3 
The Minister gained an important prerogative through the recent amendments of 
the law, by receiving command and control authority over the Military Police and 
Military Counterintelligence Services. These two institutions were initially guided by the 
General Staff and, as is generally the case, their supervision in terms of political control 
was difficult. On the grounds this obstacle for imposing civilian control over the 
important part of the Armed Forces structure is eradicated. 
In performing his duties the Minister of Defense is assisted by the Defense 
Council and the Inspectorate. The Defense Counsel consists of the Chief of the General 
Staff, his first Deputy, the Deputy Ministers of Defense, and the Chiefs of Staff of the 
NAVY, Air Force, and Land Forces. In its meetings the Defense Council deliberates on 
issues of the military policy, the military budget, military aspects of national security, and 
the structure and the functions of the Ministry of Defense. 144 
The Inspectorate is created to assist the Minister of Defense in exercising the 
state's national security policy. It monitors the implementation of the state policy in the 
area of national defense. The Inspectorate has also rights and duties to oversee every 
sphere of the Armed Force's activities, from planning the budget to military education 
142 That was a part of the 1997 amendments on the Defense and Armed Forces Act - Art.32a. 
143 This is a new prerogative of the Minister as a result of the 1997 amendments. 
144 See Defense and Armed Forces Act, Art. 38-39. 
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and training.145 It turns out to be an important tool in the process of imposing 
democratic civilian control over the military. As the Law 146 provides, the experts in this 
office should be both civilian and military. Since many of the civilians were and still are 
retired high-ranking officers,147 the level of civilian control might be slightly reduced. 
There are, of course, positions where the military experience is an important and 
irreplaceable advantage, but there are many others where the active duty and retired 
officers observe much more their corporate interest, than the principles of the civilian 
control. On the other hand, former military personnel might be needed to make 
assessments on military issues. Altogether, the Inspectorate holds profound potential to 
play an important role in exercising democratic civilian control, even though it definitely 
needs further involvement of more and better trained civilians. 
According to the Armed Forces and Defense Act the structure of the Ministry of 
Defense is formed by the Council of Ministers on a motion of the Minister of Defense. 
The amendments of 1997 didn't change the fact that the ministerial structure still can be 
easily reshaped. This issue has to be seen as important, because in order to create an 
efficient system of control over the military one prerequisite is the existence of a stable 
and clearly shaped structure of the Ministry of Defense. This administrative body plays a 
paramount role in the process of exercising efficient democratic civilian control. A 
complicated, awkward, and duplicated structure will deteriorate its ability to fulfil its 
145 Ibid. Art. 40. 
146 The term is used as a substitute of Armed Forces and Defense Act. 
147 For example Admiral Pavlov (retired) worked there before his appointment as a Deputy Minister and 
later ministers of defense in 1994. 
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mission. Therefore, serious steps should be made in order to streamline the existent 
structure, although this process is connected with the reduction of the personnel, that is a 
very sensitive and painful problem. 
H. THE CHIEF OF STAFF 
The President under a ministerial motion appoints the Chief of Staff every three 
years following the rotation principle between Army, Navy, and Air Force. 148 Prior to 
the amendments to the Armed Forces and Defense Act the Chief of Staff had authority to 
shape the structure of the General Staff, to sign ministerial orders when they are related to 
the Army, and to object to such orders. 149 In the latter case the issue had to be presented 
to the Council of Ministers for arbitration. These powers given to the Chief of Staff 
constituted preponderance on the military side that wasn't reconcilable with "the 
principles of civil-military relations. That is why under the last amendments from 19 
December 1997, the Minister received full authority over the Armed Forces. The Chief 
of Staff still has the authority to sign ministerial orders, but only in strictly limited cases, 
such as: 
1. The organizational building, preparation, planning, and 
maintaining of the mobilization readiness of the Bulgarian Army. 
2. The preparation and execution of mobilization. 
3. The participation of Bulgarian Army units in liquidation of disaster 
consequences. 
148 Ibid. Art. 75, Amended 19 December 1997. 
149 Defense and Armed Forces Act, Art. 75. 
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4. The participation of the Bulgarian Army units in peacekeeping, 
humanitarian, rescue, and other operations outside the national 
territory. 150 
The new version of the Armed Forces and Defense Act no longer contains a 
mechanism by which the Chief of Staff can express his disagreement with the Minister of 
Defense.' Furthermore, it is clearly stated in Article 74 that the Chief of Staff is directly 
subordinated to the Minister of Defense. These legal changes considerably improved the 
Minister's ability to command and control the Chief of Staff. Under the new legal 
framework it is hardly conceivable that a relationship like the one that developed between 
Minister Aleksandrov and Army General Petrov in terms of disagreement on personnel 
reduction will repeat itself in the future. 
The position of the Chief of Staff of the Bulgarian Armed Forces is clearly 
defined now. He still keeps a leadership over the Military Intelligence, 151 and has 
authority to approve the Bulgarian Army positions chart, but he clearly acts under 
political the guidance of the Minister of Defense and his power to oppose ministerial acts 
is clearly limited. In general, the legal framework provided by Armed Forces and 
Defense Act fostered efficient civilian control over the military'. 
150 Ibid. Art. 76, 
151 As was stated above the Minister of Defense holds responsibility of command and control over the 
Military Police and Military Counterintelligence Services. 
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v. CONCLUSION 
Bulgaria must struggle with new regional disorder that has major effects on its 
security. The realities of Balkan wars, Soviet disintegration, and political development 
on the Southern flank of Europe are issues that planners have to master. If countries in 
transition, such as Bulgaria cannot secure sufficiently their position within the new 
Europe, one can expect the old threats of the Balkan nationalism to remerge again. 
Within the Partne'rship for Peace framework Bulgaria made significant steps 
toward integration into the Euro-Atlantic security arrangements. In this process the 
Bulgarian military underwent a series of changes after 1989. One decisive step among 
those was adoption of the adequate legal basis, particularly in the last amendments of the 
Armed Forces and D~fense Act. Thus, the civil-military relations in the.country met the 
first three requirements for effective political control over the military indicated by 
Simon,' at least to a much larger extent than two years before.152 Regarding Simon's 
fourth point - restoration of military prestige and effective accountability of the Armed 
Forces - a lot of efforts should be directed in this area. What might be needed above all 
seems to be: 
7. An intensive military reform expressing itself in an efficient military 
education system. 
8. Increasing the military professionalism of the Officer Corps. 
9. Increasing military efficiency by switching from conscript to professional 
army. 153 
152 See p. 4 of the Thesis for details. 
153 That is in contentent of the goals of the Bulgarian military reform. 
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10. Reducing the total number of the Armed forces but improving their mobility 
and training. 
11. Increasing the social status of the military personnel. 
12. Eliminating the ambiguities in the legal framework. 
Recent changes in the legal basis gave a firm foundation for these steps. It is up 
to the Bulgarian political and military leaders to make this project work. 
Bulgaria stated clearly its desire to become a member of the Atlantic Alliance. It 
also declared its readiness to start accession negotiations. This policy is backed up by a 
significant majority of the public, which shares the values, principles and objectives 
represented by the Alliance, and is clearly in favor of NATO accession. 154 It came as no 
surprise that those countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary), which had made 
the most substantial progress in democratic and military reforms, were the first to be 
invited tojoin NATO. 
Therefore the only way to fulfil strategic foreign policy goals should be to follow 
their pace. A key aspect of Bulgarian strategy for NATO's admission is to demonstrate 
commitment to being a responsible partner and reliable future ally able to meet the 
obligations of membership. This objective can not be achieved without effective and 
durable democratic civilian control over the military. 
The prerequisite for such control is a clearly defined and fully accepted civilian 
decision-making system. Although the Armed Forces and Defense Act introduced the 
basic principles and norms in order to facilitate civilian control over the military, the 
154 See Table 3 in the Appendix, for opinion polls data. 
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process of legal reform is not completed. The National Security Concept, adopted 
recently, defined the nation's objective are in the process of building a safe national 
security environment. The Euro-Atlantic integration is a part of the concept and its 
paramount goal. This goal introduces a variety of indispensable requirements and 
standards that Bulgaria has to meet in order to accomplish it. The existence of a 
developed and thorough legal basis for every single act of military activity will diminish 
the chances of ambiguities or unclearness in this area. It will support establishing firm 
democratic civilian control over the military and ensure that no inappropriate 
involvement in politics will occur. 
Political and economical instability In the country elevated the role of the 
President's office, although the Constitution promulgated Bulgaria as a parliamentarian 
republic. Directly elected, the President had to abandon his arbiter's position and to play 
a significant role in politics. Apparently, he enjoys a lot of public confidence and is seen 
as a pillar of the democratic process. The President, as a supreme commander, has 
significant authority over the military, thus becoming a major actor in national security 
decision-making. Therefore, the precise distinction should be made between his and the 
Prime Minister's authority in order to escape any ambiguities and overlapping of 
responsibilities. Otherwise, the military would not know how to maneuver between both 
and whose order to follow. 
Only when there are no such ambiguities or obscurities it is possible to divide the 
functions related to the national security between several institutions without jeopardizing 
the main goal - creating a stable and safe national security environment. 
77 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
"Aleksandrov Denies Conflict With Gen. Petrov" Sofia KONTINENT, 29 July 1994. 
FBIS Daily Report-Eastern Europe; 3 August 1994 (FBIS-EEU-94-149). 
"Balkan States: History: Postwar politics and government." Britannica Online: Available 
[Online]: http://www.eb.com: 180Icgi-binlg?DocF=macro/5000/55/67 .html' 1 August 
1998. 
Bankowicz, Marek, "Bulgaria: The Continuing Revolution" in The New Democracies in 
Eastern Europe-Party systems and Political Cleavages, ed. Sten Berglund, and Jan 
Ake Dellenbrant, 2 edition, Vermont, Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 1994, p. 
229. 
BBSS Gallup International, Archive, (July 1998), Available: [Online] 
www.home.aster.netlgallup/home.html. 23 November 1998. 
Brown, J. E, The Challenge to Soviet Interests in Eastern Europe: Bulgaria and 
Czechoslovakia, The Rand Corporation, December 1986, p. 16. 
"Bulgarian Armed Force," Ministry of Defense, Public Relations Directorate, Sofia, 
1997, p. 3. 
"Bulgarian Constitutions from 1879 to 1991," Available [Online]: 
http://parliament.bglconst1971.htm, October 31, 1998. 
"Bulgaria a country study," Federal Research Division Library of Congress, ed. Glenn 
Curtis, Washington, 1992, p.29. 
"Bulgaria, military expenditure 1988-97," SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 
Available [Online]: http://www.sipri.se/cgi-binibackend/milex.pl?coun=Bulgaria.11 
September 1998. 
"Bulgaria's missile chief dismissed over NATO," Reuters, 17 March 1998. Available 
[Online]: http://www.db.online.bglbglbgarticle?artdate=17-MAR-98&artno=4. 
October 31, 1998. 
Chuleva, Galina and Derleth, Jim "The Bulgarian National Security Decision-Making 
Apparatus 1970-1994", European Security, Vo1.3, No.4, Winter 1994, Franc Cass, 
London, p. 775. 
Consultative National Security Council Act, State Gazette, Volume 13, Sofia, 11 
February 1994. 
79 
Crampton, Richard, A Short History of Modem Bulgaria, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1987, p. 24. 
Crawford, Keith, East Central European politics today, Manchester, Manchester 
University Press, 1996, p. 281. 
Defense and Armed Forces Act, adopted on 13 December 1995, State Gazette, Volume 
112, Sofia, 27 December 1995. 
Delin, L.A.D., The Communist Parties of Eastern Europe, New York, Columbia 
University Press, ed. Stephen Fischer-Galati, 1979, p. 55. 
EIU, "Country Profiles - Bulgaria," December 19, 1997. Available [Lexis/Nexis]: . 
EUROPE IBULGAR, 15 August 1998. 
Elster,Jon, Offe, Claus, and Preuss K.Ulrich, Institutional Design in Post-communist 
Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.148 .. 
"General Staff Chief Views NATO Relations." Sofia STANDART NEWS, 15 March 1994. 
Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report -
Eastern Europe; 20 March 1994 (FBIS-EEU-94-053). 
Huntington, Samuel, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 
London England, 1985, p. 83. 
ISIS - Research Report, Plamen Pantev, "The New National Security Environment and 
Its Impact on the Civil-Military Relations in Bulgaria." (17 Jul 97). Available 
[Online]: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isis/resrep05.htm. 12 February 1998. 
Johnson, David, "Splendid fellows, splendidly led - In 1878, Bulgaria had no army. By 
1913, it had one of the most formidable land forces in Europe." Available [Online]: 
http://www.thehistirynet.comIMilitaryHistory/artic1esI1997/0897text.htm. 
September 20,1998. 
Johnson, M. Mae, Civil-Military Relations and Military Refonn in Bulgaria, European 
Security, Autumn 1995, pp. 488-518. 
Joo, Rudolf, The Democratic Control of Anned Forces, Institute for Security Studies, 
Paris, February 1996, p. 4. 
Kohn, Richard, "An Essay on Civilian Control of the Military ," Available 
[Online]:http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/amdipl 3Ikohn.html, 24 August 1998. 
80 
Kujat, Harald, Major General "The Role of the Military in a Democracy," July 1998, 
"NATO Official documents." Available [Online]: 
http://www.nato.intlspeechl1998/s980702h.htm. 14 October 1998. 
Larrabee, Stephen, Instability and Change in the Balkans, Santa Monica, RAND 
Publications, 1992, p. 32. 
Lendvai, Paul, Eagles in Cobwebs, Garden City, New York, Doubleday & Company, 
1969, pp. 286-297. 
Linz, Juan and Stepan, Alfred, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 
Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, p. 333. 
Michta, Andrew, The Government and Politics of Postcommunist Europe, Westport, 
Connecticut London, Praeger, 1994, p. 88. 
Mihailova Nadezhda ;,Security in south-eastern Europe and Bulgaria's policy of NATO , 
integration", NATO Review, Spring 1998, pp. 6-9. 
National Security Concept, State Gazette, Number 46, Sofia, 22 April 1998. 
Popov, Genadi, "BSP Leader Calls for Aleksandrov's Resignation," Sofia DUMA, 24 
August 1994, FBIS Daily Report-Eastern Europe (EEU-94-168), 30 August 1994. 
"Prosecutor Confirms Bugging of Opposition Headquarters A Bulgarian Military 
Prosecutor Says Today," 17 January 1997. Available [Online]: 
http://www.frerl.org/nca/newsI19961N.R U. 961219174939 .html, 12 February 1998. 
"Prezidentut uvolni General Marin" (The President dismissed General Marin) Sofia, 
DEMOCRATIYA, 12 March 1998, Available [Online]: http://www.democracia.com. 
15 August 1998. 
Regulations for Professional Military Service, State Gazette, Volume 54, Sofia, 25 June 
1996. 
"Senior BSP Figure Poses Questions Over NATO Entry," BBC Monitoring Service: 
Eastern Europe, December 17,1994. Available [LexislNexis]: EUROPE IBULGAR, 
15 August 1998. 
"Security in south-eastern Europe and Bulgaria's policy of NATO integration." Spring 
1998, Available [Online]: http://www.nato.int.docu/review/1998/9801-o2.htm. 15 
August 1998. 
81 
Simon, Jeffry, NATO Enlargement and Central Europe, A study in Civil-Military 
Relations, Washington, Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defense 
University, 1996, pp. 26-27. 
Simon, Jeffrey, "Bulgaria and NATO: 7 Lost Years," Strategic Forum, May 1998, 
Available [Online], 14 November 1998. 
Subtchev, Konstantin, "Colonel's Discharge Called Economic Problem," Sofia 
CONTINENT, 24 August 1994, FBIS Daily Report-Eastern Europe (EEU-94-168), 
30 August 1994. 
Study of NATO Enlargement, September 1995, "NATO Official documents." Available 
[Online]: http://www.nato.int, 5 September 1998. 
Szemerkenyi, Reka, Central European Civil-Military Reforms At Risk, Oxford, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. II. 
The confidence in the President Office, BBSS Gallup International 1997 , Available 
[Online]: http://gallup.mobiltel.bvstate/president.htm (23 November 1998). 
The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd. "Bulgaria -Politics," November 1, 1995. Available 
[LexislNexis]: EUROPE IBULGAR, 15 August 1998. 
Yonchev, Dimitar, "The challenge called National Security," Kontinent, 29 October 
1993, p. 16. 
"Union of Democratic Forces" A vailable[Online]: http://www.bild.acad.bgludf/election. 
5 September 1998. 
82 
APPENDIX A 
TABLE 1. CONFIDENCE IN THE ARMED FORCES - 1997.155 
Yes No Don't know 
Total 76 9 15 
Age group 
18 - 30 years 72 13 15 
31- 40 years 71 11 19 
41- 50 years 79 8 12 
. 51 - 60 years 79 6 15 
60 + years 80 5 15 
Education 
higher, college 76 12 12 
Secondary 78 8 14 
Primary 75 9 16 
lower than primary 74 6 21 
Place of residence 
Rural 75 8 18 
Town 75 9 17 
former district town 84 6 10 
Capital 65 17 18 
Would now votefor 
BSP 83 5 12 
United Democratic Opposition 78 9 13 
MRF 83 2 15 
Euroleft 83 2 15 
BBB 72 i6 13 
Other 66 17 17 
Non-Voters 65 7 28 




TABLE 2. CONFIDENCE IN THE PRESIDENT PETAR STOYANOV, MARCH 
1997156 
Yes No Don't know 
Total 81 6 13 
Age group 
18 - 30 years 93 2 5 
31- 40 years 83 6 11 
41- 50 years 80 6 14 
51- 60 years 79 6 15 
60 + years 72 11 18 
Education 
higher, college 81 8 12 
secondary 86 6 8 
primary 77 7 17 
lower than primary 72 6 22 
Place of residence 
rural 78 7 14 
town 79 8 13 
former district town 84 4 12 
capital 87 5 8 
Would now vote/or 
BSP 42 26 32 




Euroleft 60 10 31 
BBB 94 3 3 
Other 76 10 15 
Non-Voters 66 9 25 




TABLE 3. JOING THE NATO?157 
Agree Disagree Cannot say Don't Know 
Age group 
18 - 30 years 58 11 18 13 
31- 40 years 51 12 14 23 
41- 50 years 46 17 18 20 
51- 60 years 39 22 16 22 
60 + years 30 22 18 30 
Would now votefor 
BSP 8 52 21 19 
United Democratic 67 4 15 15 Opposition 
BBB 45 13 19 23 
Euroleft 7 48 41 5 
MRF 33 4 2 60 
Other 35 25 25 15 
Non-Voters 17 23 17 43 
Place of residence 
rural 37 15 15 33 
town 47 19 16 18 
Former district town 45 17 19 19 
Capital 56 17 19 8 




INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center ................................................................... 2 
8725 John J. Kingman Road, Ste 0944 
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218 
2. Dudley Knox Library .............................................................................................. 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
411 Dyer Road 
Monterey, California 93943-5101 
3. Thomas Bruneau .................................................................................................... 1 
Code NSlBn 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
4. Donald Abenheim .................................................................................................... 1 
NS/AH 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
5. Edwin Micewski ................... : .......................................................... : ...................... :. 1 
NSIME 
Naval Postgraduate School 
.Monterey, CA 93943 
6. MAJ Kevin R.Rardin ....................................................................... 1 
JA, TNARNG 
2185 Wickersham Lane 
Germantown, TN. 38139 
7. Center for Civil-Military Relations ......................................................................... 1 
CodeSM 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
8. Ms. Vanessa Murray ............................................................................................... 2 
Director, Legislation and Programs Policy Office 
Defense Security Assistance Agency 
Crystal Gateway North, Suite 303 
1111 Jefferson Davis Highway 
Arlington, VA 22202-4306 
89 




Washington, DC 20350 
10. MAl Galentin Gueorguiev ...................................................................................... .3 
Ministry of Defense of 
Republic of Bulgaria 
Legal Directorate 
3 Levski Str., Sofia, 1000, 
Bulgaria 
90 
